Secret Diplomacy: How Far Can It Be Eliminated?Reinsch, Paul S. (Paul Samuel)
Philosophy
Secret Diplomacy: How Far Can It Be Eliminated?
Reinsch, Paul S. (Paul Samuel)
Diplomacy; Europe -- Politics and government
Regarded in its broader aspects there are two conceptions of diplomacy
which are quite antagonistic and which have divided thinkers since
the time of Machiavelli and Grotius. These two great minds may indeed
be considered as typifying the two tendencies and expressing them in
themselves and through the sentiments which their thought and writings
have engendered in their successors.
We have the conception of diplomacy as working out a complex system
of state action, balancing and counterbalancing forces and material
resources and giving direction to the innermost purposes of the state.
It is probable that all professional diplomats are more or less
enchanted by this ideal. Up to the great war, Bismarck was generally
considered the ablest master of diplomacy, and his action seemed to
supply short-cuts for historical forces to work out their natural aims.
Nationalism was the word of the day and the creation of the German
national state, foreordained as it seemed by the laws of history, was
accelerated by the masterful action of the great diplomat. But we are
now able to see wherein lay the limitations of this method as applied
by Bismarck. Notwithstanding his grasp of historic principles of
development, he did not, after all, work in unison with broad natural
forces, but relied on his power to dominate other men through forceful
mastery, with dynastic associations. He was a superman rather than a
great representative of a people’s aspirations. So while he proclaimed
the truthfulness of his diplomacy, it was nevertheless kept essentially
as his own and his master’s affair and business, rather than the
people’s. The base of his policy was narrow. He understood nationalism
from a Prussian point of view. He severed Austria from Germany, and
then antagonized France by taking Lorraine; far more important still,
he failed to strengthen German relations with Central Europe and thus
made it later seem necessary for Germany to go on to the sea and thus
to arouse the apprehensions and enmity of England. Thus while he
himself would probably have in the end avoided confronting the entire
world as enemies, the foundations he had laid did not provide a safe
footing for the more ordinary men who followed him. His diplomacy, once
considered so great, had contained no adequate and sound foundation
for permanent national life. Such have been the results of the most
distinguished and successful work of manipulative diplomacy during the
Nineteenth Century.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account