but will _himself_ insist upon, the most rigid inquiry into his conduct. "But, my lords, to call for a printer, in the case of a libel, when he gives up his author (although a modern procedure) _is not founded in law_; for in the statute of Westminster, the 1st, chapter 34, it is said, 'None shall report any false and slanderous news or tales of _great men_, whereby any discord may arise betwixt the king and his people, on pain of imprisonment, _until they bring forth the author_.' The statutes of the 2d of Richard the Second, chapter 5, and the 14th of the same reign, are to the same effect. It is there enacted, that 'No person shall devise, or tell any _false_ news or lies of any lord, prelate, officer of the government, judge, &c., by which any slander shall happen to their persons, or mischief come to the kingdom, upon pain of being imprisoned; and where any one hath told false news or lies, and cannot produce the author, he shall suffer imprisonment, and be punished by the king's counsel.' Here, then, my lords, two things are clearly pointed out, to wit, the person to be punished, and what the mode of punishment is. The person to be punished is the author, when produced; the mode of punishment is by the king's counsel; so that, in the present case, the printer having given up the author, he is discharged from punishment: and if the privilege of punishment had been in this House, the right is barred by these statutes; for how is the punishment to be had? Not by this House, but by the king's counsel. And, my lords, it cannot be otherwise; for, if it were, the freedom of the press were at an end; and for this purpose was this modern doctrine, to answer modern views, invented,--_a doctrine which I should ever stand up in opposition to, if even the right of its exercise were in us_. But the right is not in us: it is a jurisdiction too summary for the freedom of our constitution, and incompatible with liberty. It takes away the trial by jury; which king, lords, and commons, _have not a right to do_. It is to make us accusers, judges, jury, and executioners too, if we please. It is to give us an executive power, to which, in our legislative capacities, we are not entitled. It is to give us a power, which even the executive power itself has not, which the prerogative of the crown dare not assume, which the king himself cannot exercise. My lords, _the king cannot touch the hair of any man's head in this country, though he be guilty of high treason, but by means of the law. It is the law that creates the offence; it is a jury that must determine the guilt; it is the law that affixes the punishment; and all other modes of proceeding are_ ILLEGAL. Why then, my lords,