"The court is obliged, very greatly obliged, both to the doctor and to the colonel, for the cordial manner in which they have met the issues of this case. The court was reasonably satisfied before, but is still better satisfied now, that nothing of wrong was intended in all that had been done; that it was simply an error of judgment, and that none will be found more ready than themselves to correct the error so soon as they are satisfied that it is an error. About the facts of the case there is no dispute whatever. All the statements agree. The only question, therefore, is as to the reason or the law of the case. This court is not strictly a law court. It is rather a court of necessity--of a 'necessity that knows no law'--or of equity; but in this particular case it might well afford to stand upon the law alone, even if there were no equities in the case to be considered. "The act passed by the United States Congress, on the 6th of August last, known as the 'Confiscation Act,' provides that, 'in the present or any future insurrection, any property given to aid such insurrection, or used for that purpose with the knowledge and consent of the owner, shall be subject to seizure and confiscation; that actions for the condemnation of such property shall be brought in circuit, district, or admiralty courts having jurisdiction of the amount, and that the attorney-general, or any district attorney, may institute proceedings, which in such cases _shall be wholly for the benefit of the United States, etc_.' It will be observed how carefully Congress has pointed out every step of the way by which this act shall be executed; and in order to avoid any possibility of private peculation, the act says, in so many words, 'such case shall be wholly--not in part, but wholly--for the benefit of the United States.' There is nothing in this act to justify a private individual in taking so much as the value of a pin from a house abandoned by an avowed enemy, much less from the house of one who still claims the protection of the common laws of his country, though in temporary rebellion against the authorities now in power. The court, it will be remarked, puts emphasis upon the words _private individual_; for it holds that, for purposes of the army, for purposes of attack and defence, for purposes of sustenance and locomotion, or even for purposes of comfort, an army, or any regularly organized part of an army, may seize, hold, and use any property, real or personal, that may have belonged to those now in arms against that government.