Secrets of the Late Rebellion, Now Revealed for the First TimeFreese, Jacob R.
History
Secrets of the Late Rebellion, Now Revealed for the First Time
Freese, Jacob R.
United States -- Politics and government -- 1861-1865
When, besides going into Virginia, Union armies commenced forward
movements into Kentucky and Tennessee, into Missouri and Arkansas, it
was deemed expedient to run off a large number of the slaves of those
States into Texas, the better to secure them from capture by the Union
armies, and have them where they could be shipped to foreign ports,
if not thereafter needed by the States of the Confederacy, or if,
peradventure, the Confederacy itself might fail of success. When, on the
16th of November, 1864, Sherman commenced his march "from Atlanta to
the sea," a like necessity of getting slaves beyond the reach of Union
soldiers existed in all the Gulf States, and so far as it was possible
to get them into Texas it was done. How many thousands, yea, how many
hundreds of thousands were thus driven into Texas from other Confederate
States, God only knows, or will ever know!
This particular route was made necessary because of the blockading of
Southern ports; and because once in Texas, they could be held there
until the result of the war was known. It was not, as before stated,
the policy of the Confederate Government to have the slaves taken beyond
their control, as the corner-stone of the Confederacy was to be slavery,
and the more they could have of it the greater, they thought, would be
their prosperity; nor was it the policy of the slave-dealer to take his
chattel beyond the reach of the best market in the world, so long as
there was a reasonable prospect of that market being kept open. In
Texas the dealer had the double chance--either to return with his human
chattels to the Confederate States, in case it became an established
government, or, if that failed, then to ship them from Brazos San Diego,
from Brownsville, from Corpus Christi, from Powder Horn, or from any
other port that might not be blockaded, to Cuba, to Brazil, or wherever
else slavery existed and a market could be found. These slave-dealers
watched the result of the contest between the North and the South with
the same interest that stock-jobbers and gold-gamblers watched the rise
and fall of stocks, and the rise and fall of gold, when they had a large
quantity of either on hand, and were waiting to turn their speculation
to the best possible account. When news would reach them that the Union
armies were carrying everything before them, off would go one or more
cargoes of negroes to Cuba or Brazil. When, by the next mail probably,
news would reach them that the Confederate armies were meeting with
great successes, making it probable that a Southern Confederacy would be
established, they would regret that they had sent any away, and hold
the firmer to those they had left. The price at which slaves could be
sold--especially at forced or hurried sales--in the Brazil and Cuban
markets, was far less than what they could reasonably hope to obtain
in the Southern Confederacy, _provided_ it became an acknowledged
government.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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