Libel and slander; Sermons, English -- 17th century; Swearing
important good, as a servant of the best charity, may be allowed.
4. Some errors likewise in this way may be most properly and most
successfully confuted; such as deserve not, and hardly can bear a
serious and solid confutation. He that will contest things
apparently decided by sense and experience, or who disavows clear
principles of reason, approved by general consent and the common
sense of men, what other hopeful way is there of proceeding with
him, than pleasantly to explode his conceits? To dispute seriously
with him were trifling; to trifle with him is the proper course.
Since he rejecteth the grounds of reasoning, 'tis vain to be in
earnest; what then remains but to jest with him? To deal seriously
were to yield too much respect to such a baffler, and too much
weight to his fancies; to raise the man too high in his courage and
conceit; to make his pretences seem worthy the considering and
canvassing. Briefly, perverse obstinacy is more easily quelled,
petulant impudence is sooner dashed, sophistical captiousness is
more safely eluded, sceptical wantonness is more surely confounded
in this than in the simple way of discourse.
5. This way is also commonly the best way of defence against unjust
reproach and obloquy. To yield to a slanderous reviler a serious
reply, or to make a formal plea against his charge, doth seem to
imply that we much consider or deeply resent it; whereas by pleasant
reflection on it we signify the matter only deserves contempt, and
that we take ourselves unconcerned therein. So easily without care
or trouble may the brunts of malice be declined or repelled.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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