Libel and slander; Sermons, English -- 17th century; Swearing
5. Another slanderous course is, to build censures and reproaches
upon slender conjectures, or uncertain suspicions (those [Greek],
evil surmises, which St. Paul condemneth). Of these occasion can
never be wanting to them who seek them, or are ready to embrace
them; no innocence, no wisdom can anywise prevent them; and if they
may be admitted as grounds of defamation, no man's good name can be
secure. But he that upon such accounts dareth to asperse his
neighbour is in moral computation no less a slanderer than if he did
the like out of pure invention, or without any ground at all: for
doubtful and false in this case differ little; to devise, and to
divine, in matters of this nature, do import near the same. He that
will judge or speak ill of others, ought to be well assured of what
he thinks or says; he that asserteth that which he doth not know to
be true, doth as well lie as he that affirmeth that which he knoweth
to be false; for he deceiveth the hearers, begetting in them an
opinion that he is assured of what he affirms; especially in dealing
with the concernments of others, whose right and repute justice doth
oblige us to beware of infringing, charity should dispose us to
regard and tender as our own. It is not every possibility, every
seeming, every faint show or glimmering appearance, which sufficeth
to ground bad opinion or reproachful discourse concerning our
brother: the matter should be clear, notorious and palpable, before
we admit a disadvantageous conceit into our head, a distasteful
resentment into our heart, a harsh word into our mouth about him.
Men may fancy themselves sagacious and shrewd, persons of deep
judgment and fine wit they may be taken for, when they can dive into
others' hearts, and sound their intentions; when through thick mists
or at remote distances they can descry faults in them; when they
collect ill of them by long trains, and subtle fetches of discourse:
but in truth they do thereby rather betray in themselves small love
of truth, care of justice, or sense of charity, together with little
wisdom and discretion: for truth is only seen in a clear light;
justice requireth strict proof. Charity "thinketh no evil," and
"believeth all things" for the best; wisdom is not forward to
pronounce before full evidence. ("He," saith the wise man, "that
answereth a matter before he heareth it, it is folly and shame unto
him.") In fine, they who proceed thus, as it is usual that they
speak falsely, as it is casual that they ever speak truly, as they
affect to speak ill, true or false; so worthily they are to be
reckoned among slanderers.
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