Seventeen Talks on the Banking Question: Between Uncle Sam and Mr. Farmer, Mr. Banker, Mr. Lawyer, Mr. Laboringman, Mr. Merchant, Mr. ManufacturerFowler, Charles N. (Charles Newell)
History
Seventeen Talks on the Banking Question: Between Uncle Sam and Mr. Farmer, Mr. Banker, Mr. Lawyer, Mr. Laboringman, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Manufacturer
Fowler, Charles N. (Charles Newell)
Banks and banking -- United States; Currency question -- United States
"Any person engaged in a legitimate trade in any part of New England
could exchange his promissory note, running 60 or 90 days, for the
notes of a bank with which he could pay the wages of his employees, or
buy the materials for his industry in any part of the United States or
Canada. The notes would remain in circulation about five weeks, and
then find their way to the Suffolk Bank, where they were offset by the
notes of other banks which took their rise in the same way. The man
whose promissory note the bank had discounted, and by means of which it
had put its own notes in circulation, had meanwhile sold his products.
If he had sold them in Boston, his draft on the Boston merchant would
pay his note at the local bank, and this would enable the latter to
keep its balance good at the Suffolk. If he had sold them in New York
or Chicago, he would get his pay in a draft on Boston, which would
answer the same end. If he had sold them at home, and had received New
England Bank Notes in exchange for them, the local bank could use these
to keep its balance good at the Suffolk. New England trade was carried
on by an endless chain of offsets and book balances at the Suffolk
Bank. The security for the notes consisted of the bank's assets, and
the banker's moral character and business sagacity. Both notes and
deposits rested upon the same security that deposits rest upon now, and
the volume of both was determined by the wants of trade."
The interplay of bank book credit and bank note credit under the
Suffolk System in the panic of 1857 is nowhere equaled in the history
of banking; and that demonstration of the perfect adaptability of bank
credit to the most sensitive, and at the same time the most extreme
situation that can possibly arise, leaves no question unanswered as to
its fitness under all circumstances to meet the requirements of the
people.
A year before the panic, the note issue stood at $50,000,000, and the
deposits were $32,000,000. As a result of the panic, there was an
exigent demand for currency, and the note issue rose from $50,000,000
to $56,000,000, and the deposits fell at the same time from $32,000,000
to $25,000,000, showing a conversion of about $6,000,000 of book
credits into note credits, or of deposits into currency.
A year afterwards, when this exigent demand for currency had subsided,
and the reaction had set in, the notes fell from $56,000,000
to $35,000,000, and the deposits increased from $35,000,000 to
$46,000,000. In other words, $21,000,000 of notes were deposited and
took the form of deposits, subject to check.
I do not need to state the fact, except for the purpose of calling your
attention to it, that this currency did not cost the people of New
England any more than deposits; for the two were constantly changing
places with each other, strictly in accordance with the needs of trade.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account