Sextus Empiricus and Greek ScepticismPatrick, Mary Mills
Philosophy
Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism
Patrick, Mary Mills
Sextus Empiricus; Skepticism
In apparent contradiction to his statement in _Hypotyposes_ I.,
that Scepticism and Empiricism are opposed to each other, in
that Empiricism denies the possibility of knowledge, and
Scepticism makes no dogmatic statements of any kind, Sextus
classes the Sceptics and Empiricists together in another
instance, as regarding knowledge as impossible[6] [Greek: all oi
men phasin auta me katalambanesthai, hoster hoi apo tes
empeirias iatroi kai hoi apo tes skepseos phiolosophoi]. In
another case, on the contrary, he contrasts the Sceptics sharply
with the Empiricists in regard to the [Greek: apodeixeis].[7]
[Greek: hoi de empeirikoi anairousin, hoi de skeptikoi en epoche
tauten ephylaxan].
[1] _Hyp_. ii. 238.
[2] _Adv. Math_. A. 260.
[3] _Adv. Math_. vii. 202.
[4] _Adv. Math_. A. 61.
[5] Zeller _Op. cit._. iii. 43.
[6] _Adv. Math._ viii. 191.
[7] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 328.
Pappenheim thinks that Sextus belonged to the Methodical School,
both from his strong expression in favor of that school in
_Hyp_. I. 236, as above, and also because many of his
medical opinions, as found in his works, agree with the
teachings of the Methodical School, more nearly than with those
of the Empiricists. Pappenheim also claims that we find no
inconsistency with this view in the passage given where Sextus
classes the Sceptics with the Empiricists, but considers that
statement an instance of carelessness in expressing himself, on
the part of Sextus.[1]
[1] _Lebensverhaeltnisse des Sex. Em._ 36.
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