Nearer to man stand the higher mammals. Every one is aware of the sentiments of sympathy and duty in the dog, for instance. In man himself these affections are pre-eminently domestic, as may be seen in the love of mother and child, husband and wife, father and son, and in all the obligations thus contracted. But they also have a considerable tendency to extend to other intimate objects or persons with whom the individual frequently comes into contact――to friends, animals, etc. We can also observe this inclination among bees and ants, where strangers are received into the hive or nest after a short period of familiarisation. But among mankind the tendency always maintains a strongly individual character. The result is on the one hand a grouping into communities, such as castes, tribes, and nations; and on the other a host of individual friendships and enmities. This fundamentally individual character of the human sense of sympathy rests primarily upon the fact that our nearest ancestors in the animal world, the parents of the existing anthropoid apes, were domestic and solitary, while our primeval ancestors lived in numberless tiny communities, inimical to one another. In this way there appeared among mankind instinctive and exclusive impulses of sympathy and of duty, combined with intensely selfish predatory desires. The extraordinary complexity of the human brain is responsible for the strange many-sidedness of character which resulted. For example, crime and heroism developed side by side; child murder, parricide, rapine and robbery, slavery, war, and in particular the vilest subjugation of woman as an article of commerce or a beast of burden――these represent the fruits of egotism and its attendant cunning and meanness. On the other hand we see self-sacrifice, valour, heroic martyrdom, patriotism, sense of justice, asceticism, pity for the weak, and persistent labour for the family and the State, resulting as the fruits of the instinct of sympathy and the social sense. The primitive sense of duty, which arose from direct assistance rendered to the object of sympathy, is now being enlarged by a higher racial and individual development, and is, indeed, resolving itself into a universal inclination to subdue egoistic instincts and passions. If from a sense of duty I do something which is wearisome or dangerous, it is for the most part no longer out of direct sympathy with the particular object. The primeval impulse (which led to conflict) is becoming independent, and is taking the form of a higher and secondary instinct, tending towards the suppression of baser desires and weaknesses. And yet it is necessary, in order to prevent the degeneration of this instinct, that the objects towards which it is directed shall be ever more adequately and better suited to the social welfare of the community. * * * * *