We should also learn from other states who have demonstrated effective application of the characteristics of Rapid Dominance. Israel's rout of Syria's air force and missile defenses in Lebanon's Baaka Valley shows how dramatic success can have political spillover. On the other hand, Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor produced the reverse effects of Shock and Awe and had the unintended consequence of galvanizing the U.S. into action. Even without a Rapid Dominance capability or when facing a more technologically dependent opponent, it is clear from these examples and many others in recent U.S. experiences that certain improvements in capabilities would provide us with greater flexibility in the future. This is especially true in OOTW situations, which require a multiplicity of effective instruments at our disposal. It is also true that certain operations such as peacekeeping tend to be manpower intensive. If we are to stay ahead of an adversary and deny things of value to that adversary, dynamic, accurate, and integrated intelligence is essential. Intelligence needs to move to levels unprecedented in scope, timeliness, accuracy, and availability in real time. The Gulf War, despite its success, showed classic limitations in intelligence. Even though we had nearly every intelligence asset designed to deal with the USSR available for use, we were unable to detect the full extent of Iraq's WMD capability; unable to find mobile missile launchers even with a major expenditure of on-scene assets; in some cases, we could only "see" kilometers in front of our advancing forces; and we mistakenly attacked targets we thought were legitimate but had civilians inside. In some instances, only reliable human intelligence may provide the necessary information (for example, in order to understand what is happening in deep underground facilities). Another important capability we should try to achieve in the future is the ability to intimidate, capture, convince, or significantly influence the perceptions and understanding of individual troublemakers. This need has been demonstrated repeatedly in recent years (e.g., Gadhafi in Libya, Aideed in Somalia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Noreiga in Panama). Such a perception is particularly relevant when the problem appears not to be caused by a unified population but by the ambitions of individual leaders who have intimidated or killed off any likely internal opposition. Such a capability requires effective real-time intelligence and a variety of methods for accomplishing the task (from exceptionally precise weapons to effective "snatch" operations).