At this point, one can only raise these types of issues to be addressed at a later date. This line of questions, concerns, and issues, as well as a host of others, needs to be raised up front during the concept development phase of the development of specific Mission Capability Package concepts. We must be careful that we do not overvisualize Rapid Dominance versus the reality of credible/affordable capabilities to execute the concept. Rapid Dominance does not eliminate the fog of war. Decisions will still be made on the leader's judgment and confidence in the intelligence provided, the estimate of threat intentions, knowledge of true center of gravity targets, and confidence in our own force capabilities to inflict Shock and Awe. In fact, the ability to penetrate this fog is the key to Rapid Dominance. Complicating the issue is the fact that the U.S. has not clearly defined its role in the post-Cold War era. As the world's only credible superpower, the U.S. can not avoid a leadership role, but neither can it avoid the focused criticism applied to all leaders. We are in the classical "damned if we do and damned if we don't" syndrome. One of the serious side effects of Rapid Dominance could be that if you adapt a strategy of Rapid Dominance and succeed, you may now own the problem and be responsible for the solution. Do we know the funding tail to such a policy and are we as a nation ready to accept this cost when/if Rapid Dominance is applied in situations that are less than of vital interest? This subject needs further development beyond the limitations of this book. Rapid Dominance and The Future Battlefield