Short Studies on Great SubjectsFroude, James Anthony
Religion
Short Studies on Great Subjects
Froude, James Anthony
English essays; English literature; History; Religion -- Biography
Although, however, we may justly quarrel with such unlooked-for
difficulties, the important question, after all, is not of the obscurity
of these axioms, but of their truth. Many things in all the sciences are
obscure to an unpractised understanding, which are true enough and clear
enough to people acquainted with the subjects, and they may be fairly
made the foundations of a scientific system, although rudimentary
students must be contented to accept them upon faith. Of course, also,
it is entirely competent to Spinoza, or to any one, to define the terms
which he intends to use just as he pleases, provided it be understood
that any conclusions which he derives out of them apply only to the
ideas so defined, and not to any supposed object existing which
corresponds with them. Euclid defines his triangles and circles, and
discovers that to figures so described, certain properties previously
unknown may be proved to belong. But as in nature there are no such
things as triangles and circles exactly answering the definition, his
conclusions, as applied to actually existing objects, are either not
true at all or only proximately so. Whether it be possible to bridge
over the gulf between existing things and the abstract conception of
them, as Spinoza attempts to do, we shall presently see. It is a royal
road to certainty if it be a practicable one; but we cannot say that we
ever met any one who could say honestly Spinoza's reasonings had
convinced him; and power of demonstration, like all other powers, can be
judged only by its effects. Does it prove? does it produce conviction?
If not, it is nothing.
We need not detain our readers among these abstractions. The power of
Spinozism does not lie so remote from ordinary appreciation, or we
should long ago have heard the last of it. Like all other systems which
have attracted followers, it addresses itself, not to the logical
intellect, but to the imagination, which it affects to set aside. We
refuse to submit to the demonstrations by which it thrusts itself upon
our reception; but regarding it as a whole, as an attempt to explain the
nature of the world of which we are a part, we can still ask ourselves
how far the attempt is successful. Some account of these things we know
that there must be, and the curiosity which asks the question regards
itself, of course, as competent in some degree to judge of the answer to
it.
Before proceeding, however, to regard this philosophy in the aspect in
which it is really powerful, we must clear our way through the fallacy
of the method.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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