Short Studies on Great SubjectsFroude, James Anthony
Religion
Short Studies on Great Subjects
Froude, James Anthony
English essays; English literature; History; Religion -- Biography
The system is evolved in a series of theorems in severely demonstrative
order out of the definitions and axioms which we have translated. To
propositions 1-6 we have nothing to object; they will not, probably,
convey any very clear ideas, but they are so far purely abstract, and
seem to follow (as far as we can speak of 'following' in such subjects)
by fair reasoning. 'Substance is prior in nature to its affections.'
'Substances with different attributes have nothing in common,' and,
therefore, 'one cannot be the cause of the other.' 'Things really
distinct are distinguished by difference either of attribute or mode
(there being nothing else by which they can be distinguished), and,
therefore, because things modally distinguished do not _qua_ substance
differ from one another, there cannot be more than one substance of the
same attribute. Therefore (let us remind our readers that we are among
what Spinoza calls _notiones simplicissimas_), since there cannot be two
substances of the same attribute, and substances of different attributes
cannot be the cause one of the other, it follows that no substance can
be produced by another substance.'
The existence of substance, he then concludes, is involved in the nature
of the thing itself. Substance exists. It does and must. We ask, why?
and we are answered, because there is nothing capable of producing it,
and therefore it is self-caused--_i.e._ by the first definition the
essence of it implies existence as part of the idea. It is astonishing
that Spinoza should not have seen that he assumes the fact that
substance does exist in order to prove that it must. If it cannot be
produced _and_ exists, then, of course, it exists in virtue of its own
nature. But supposing it does not exist, supposing it is all a delusion,
the proof falls to pieces. We have to fall back on the facts of
experience, on the obscure and unscientific certainty that the thing
which we call the world, and the personalities which we call ourselves,
are a real substantial something, before we find ground of any kind to
stand upon. Conscious of the infirmity of his demonstration, Spinoza
winds round it and round it, adding proof to proof, but never escaping
the same vicious circle: substance exists because it exists, and the
ultimate experience of existence, so far from being of that clear kind
which can be accepted as an axiom, is the most confused of all our
sensations. What is existence? and what is that something which we say
exists? Things--essences--existences! these are but the vague names with
which faculties, constructed only to deal with conditional phenomena,
disguise their incapacity. The world in the Hindoo legend was supported
upon the back of the tortoise. It was a step between the world and
nothingness, and served to cheat the imagination with ideas of a
fictitious resting-place.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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