Siberia (Russia); Siberia (Russia) -- Description and travel
There were considerable international politics being let loose in that
room. In effect, the Japanese were backing Kalmikoff, and when we came
to protest against Kalmikoff’s actions, we were really protesting what
appeared to be actions advised by the Japanese; at least, it is safe
to draw the conclusion that, owing General Oi what he asserted he did,
Kalmikoff was not running counter to General Oi’s wishes. And I have
heard it said that whenever Colonel Styer asked Kalmikoff to explain
the reasons for executions, Kalmikoff went directly to General Oi’s
headquarters before making his reply to Colonel Styer.
I do not bring these matters in as a criticism of the Japanese. I
cite heresay and such facts as I know, to show that the Japanese were
stronger politically in their situation in that part of Siberia,
than we were. It may be safely assumed that General Oi was acting
according to instructions, and from that I deduce that the Japanese
government had a policy of upholding all forces avowedly and surely
anti-Bolshevists. It may have been the correct policy. At least,
Kalmikoff knew that he could depend upon the Japanese to back him up
in putting down the Bolshevists. He had no such assurance from our
government.
It is human nature to lean to the side which declares itself, and
the Japanese made no secret of the fact that they were backing
Kalmikoff with arms and money, and standing in the background while he
consolidated his power. This means that the Japanese were really in
control of things in the Ussuri, and for wanting to hold that control,
I do not blame them, considering that they had large military forces in
the country, and were there as enemies to the Bolshevists.
The Japanese took sides. This meant that at least one side knew them as
friends. In our case, the anti-Bolshevist forces of the Russians, then
chiefly the Cossack forces, were confused by our attitude of grouping
all Russian factions and classes together, with what appeared to be
a distinct leaning to the Bolshevist side. The result was that real
anti-Bolshevists suspected our motives and were most cautious in taking
us into their confidence. But the Japanese had the full confidence of
the anti-Bolshevist leaders, and to have the confidence of either side
in such times, gives a decided advantage in getting a grasp of the
situation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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