According to a memorandum of September 11, 1918, the War Department established the commands to be occupied by white and colored officers in the organization of the 92nd Division, and indicated that every opportunity would be given the Negro men to advance. In practice, however, there seems to have been some difficulty about carrying out the ideas therein suggested. The percentage of white officers in the Division increased from 18 per cent at the beginning, to 42 per cent on November 30, 1918. Very few recommendations for the promotion of Negro officers were made and most of these are said to have been “pigeon-holed” at headquarters. Some recommendations that were filed in July and August, 1918, were held until after the signing of the Armistice on November 11, when an A. E. F. order prohibited the granting of any more commissions. Another factor which prevented promotions in the 92nd Division was that colored officers from the 369th, 370th, and 372nd, and graduates from officers’ training schools in France were largely transferred to the 92nd Division. This made room for the promotion of white officers in the units from which the Negro officers were transferred, but prevented the promotion of colored officers in the 92nd. Thus most of the Negro officers who served in the National Army were in the 92nd Division. The creation of this Division with Negro line officers was regarded by practically all regular army officers as one of the greatest mistakes ever made by the War Department. From their viewpoint it was wrong in principle, against all tradition, and could not possibly be a success. Not believing in the matter in principle, they did not want to deal with Negro men on such a basis; they did things to discredit them, even to the extent of spreading propaganda as to their unfitness for the work. Thus unfortunately the Negro officers returned home feeling that their commanding officers were not their friends; nor were matters improved by the effort of some incompetent men “higher up” who tried to cover their own inefficiency by laying the blame on the Negroes. The prevailing opinion expressed by the white officers returning from France was that the Negro soldier up to the rank of sergeant-major was a success, and they lauded the stevedore and labor organizations as contributing much to the magnificent service rendered by the Americans in Europe. The “experiment” of the Negro officer, they felt, was a different matter. A careful review of all the adverse points made might place them under four heads, as follows: First, the racial distinctions recognized in civilian life continued to be recognized in military life and presented a formidable barrier to the existence of a genuine feeling of comradeship; second, the colored officers were lacking in initiative and exhibited a characteristic tendency to neglect the welfare of their men and to perform their duties in a perfunctory manner, thus entailing on the part of senior