But the turning force of 12,000 men had fifteen miles of wagons accompanying it, and was to take with it only four days’ provisions, which, of course, could be filled up by Sir Redvers Buller so long as it was in road communication with him; but, as soon as this was broken, Sir Charles Warren’s operations were limited to what he could do in four days. And that Sir Redvers Buller intended the road communication to be broken is shown by his request in the instructions that as soon as Sir Charles Warren had made the passage of the river he should, if possible, send the pontoons to him. Finally, Sir Charles Warren was directed by these instructions to send the eight naval 12-pr. guns to Sir Redvers Buller, a step which had a very important bearing upon the final issue of the undertaking. The success of Sir Charles Warren, therefore, depended upon his being able to accomplish his flanking movement in four days from the time of leaving his temporary base, upon his having no necessity for long-range guns, and upon the right flank of the Boers, which he was to turn, being within easy reach. It is, however, well to read the views of others on the spot of the intentions of Sir Redvers Buller. Thus Bishop Baynes of Natal, in ‘My Diocese during the War,’ gives some information on the subject, which was obtained at first hand from Major-General Lyttelton. On pages 180 and 181 he says: ‘_Tuesday, Jan. 16th._--I went up the hill after breakfast: when I came back to lunch I found the camp in a stir. At last the orders had come to move, and the plan of campaign was declared, and General Lyttelton explained it to me. Our brigade is to move off about 2.30 to the river, and two battalions are to cross Potgieter’s Drift to-night and the rest to-morrow. To-morrow our big guns will open on the Boers and we shall make a big demonstration. Meanwhile Sir Charles Warren, with his other brigade (General Woodgate’s), and with General Clery’s Division (consisting of General Hildyard’s and General Hart’s brigades), is to move away to a point five or six miles higher up the river, cross there, and approach the flank of the Boer position up the slopes of Spion Kop. The hope is that the Boers will not be able to spare men enough from here (besides Colenso and Ladysmith) to offer effective opposition to Sir Charles Warren, or, if they do, then we may get through their defences here. General Lyttelton called the colonels of his battalions together and explained the plan to them.’ Mr. J. B. Atkins, in his ‘Relief of Ladysmith,’ writes: