It seems to have been certainly known that, since the troops had marched westwards to Potgieter’s on 10th January, large bodies of Boers had been moving up the river from the neighbourhood of Colenso, and massing behind Spion Kop and Acton Homes, and that near the latter place there was a large Boer camp which supplied the camp behind Spion Kop with provisions. It was also understood that the Orange Free State Boers were posted along the right of the line as far as Spion Kop, and that thence the Transvaal Boers were extended to the left or eastward; that, in the vicinity of Spion Kop and Groote Hoek, there were five or six large camps, their position being very central, as from that point the Boers could easily go in an hour either west to Acton Homes on the one side, or east to Doorn Kloof on the other. Thus, in whatever direction our troops marched along the Boer lines, they were always confronted by a large body of Boers. A trench had been cut along the Boer lines behind Potgieter’s Drift as far west as Spion Kop, with a number of men always in it so long as the main body of the British force faced them. On Spion Kop itself, on the east side, were four guns, which, it was said, would rake Trichard’s Drift at long ranges, while to the west of Spion Kop, on the Rangeworthy hills, an intrenchment had been made and was held by the enemy, who could be readily reinforced should the British cross the drift. It must not, however, be supposed that Boers can fight only behind prepared trenches. They are experts at quickly raising up ‘schanzes,’ which they make in a few minutes, and they only construct regular trenches when they have considerable time at their disposal, or when there is no natural material lying handy on the ground. On Spion Kop, and to the west over the Rangeworthy hills and beyond, the Boers did not require trenches to make an effectual resistance. There was plenty of material to enable them to hold the crests of the hills against a far superior force; but they preferred to make their position almost impregnable by selecting continuous grassy slopes, over which an advance would be impracticable in daylight. From such positions nothing but artillery fire could drive them out. CHAPTER III ADVANCE TO VENTER’S LAAGER AND ATTACK OF THE RANGEWORTHY HILLS At the end of Chapter II we left Sir Charles Warren across the Tugela with all his force, including his wagons, on the night of 18th January and ready to march to Venter’s Laager on the following morning.