One has really to call to mind that it is Sir Charles Warren’s commanding officer who gives utterance to these observations, that he personally saw the troops under Warren cross the Tugela, that he issued to them the ‘no turning back’ order, that he addressed General Woodgate’s Brigade when it had crossed and gave that General instructions as to his attack, that from day to day he telegraphed home encouraging accounts of the operations being carried out, that he made no sign of disapproval, that he was in telegraphic communication with Sir Charles Warren all the time and many messages passed to and fro, that on three days out of the four--viz. on the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd--he was personally present with the force and the dispositions of the troops were made subject to his approval, that he had himself given directions how the howitzers were to be disposed, and that in his telegraphic despatch of 27th January, when all was over, he had stated that ‘the actual position held was perfectly tenable but did not lend itself to advance.’ It was surely unfair to himself as well as to Sir Charles Warren to make out that for four days the troops remained in one position, and that a dangerous one. But if the dispositions were those of Sir Charles Warren, and he alone was responsible for them, did they merit the disapproval with which his chief stigmatises them? Is not the attack of a hill, whose top is exposed to the enemy’s artillery fire and affords barely any cover, best undertaken by seizing and holding the near crest line--in other words, ‘perching on its edge’? If the attack intrench this near crest, their reserves can remain lower down under cover; any shell fire which does not hit the trench passes harmlessly over; reliefs, also, can be safely carried out, and supplies of ammunition, water, and food brought up to the firing line without exposure. As we have already observed, and perhaps may be permitted to repeat in this connection, had Sir Charles Warren’s instructions been carried out at Spion Kop--and probably the fog made it difficult to do so--his firing line would have been on the outer edge of the hill, that farthest from the enemy, and not on the plateau, and what better position could it have had? A small body could have held it, which could have been relieved from time to time, and at nightfall the other crest nearest to the enemy could have been seized and intrenched. Then again reserves massed behind a hill are not in so bad a position as Sir Redvers Buller’s despatch would imply, and when he speaks of the danger of a possible sudden charge of the Boers driving the whole lot of our men in disorder down the hill, he does not appear to appreciate the distinctive qualities either of the foe or of our own men. What would Tommy Atkins have more warmly welcomed, or the Boers have more disliked, than a contest at close quarters with cold steel?