Unfortunately, the feeble intrenchments which were constructed on Spion Kop were too far advanced on the plateau of the hill, so that the approach to them from the edge of the hill was exposed to the shell and rifle fire of the enemy, and, equally unfortunately, neither mountain battery nor naval guns were sent over by Sir Redvers Buller in time to be of use in opposing the Boer fire. In a previous chapter we noted that no sign of dissatisfaction with Sir Charles Warren’s conduct appeared in any of Sir Redvers Buller’s telegrams during the operations, and if these telegrams are compared with the despatches they will be found to be glaringly inconsistent. We find, further, that while in large matters, such as the attack from the left, in which the strategy of the Commander-in-Chief might be involved, Sir Redvers Buller contented himself with advocating the course he preferred, and abstained from giving any order for its adoption, in comparatively small matters, which would more obviously lie within the province of the subordinate commander to determine, he, on several occasions, caused his own views to be carried out. Thus he substituted Major-General Woodgate for Major-General Coke in the command of the column for the assault of Spion Kop, because the one was able to climb better than the other; and he nominated over the heads of experienced colonels Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, a young and inexperienced major of a year’s standing, holding the local rank of lieut.-colonel, to command on Spion Kop after Major-General Woodgate was wounded, because he was a good hard-fighting man. Neither physical strength and ability to climb nor the gallantry of a fighting man are, however, the main qualifications of a commander, and these efforts of the Commander-in-Chief to assert himself in minor matters had, it would seem, something to say to the failure of the enterprise. That Sir Redvers Buller should endeavour to justify the retirement of Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft is not difficult to understand; that he should attempt to do so at the expense of his second-in-command is inexplicable. It was only human nature that he should wish to support the action of the gallant young officer, specially selected by himself to command over the head of his seniors, who had fought like a lion and had kept up the spirit of his men in depressing circumstances. But had the same warm and generous sentiment animated him towards his second-in-command he could not have supported the retirement by disparaging the work done by Sir Charles Warren, and by belittling or ignoring altogether the efforts he had made to enable the garrison of Spion Kop to hold on to the position.