Six metaphysical meditations: $b Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his bodyDescartes, René
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Six metaphysical meditations: $b Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
Descartes, René
Descartes, René, 1596-1650; First philosophy; God -- Proof, Ontological; Knowledge, Theory of; Metaphysics; Methodology
But also some of those very _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things which are
_clear_ and _distinct_, I may seem to have borrow’d from the _Idea_ I
have of _my self_, viz. _Substance_, _duration_, _number_, and the like;
For when I conceive a _stone_ to be a _substance_ (that is, _a thing
apt of it self to exist_) and also that I _my self_ am a _substance_,
tho I conceive _my self_ a _thinking substance_ and _not extended_, and
the _stone_ an _extended substance_ and _not thinking_, by which there
is a great _diversity_ between both the _conceptions_, yet they _agree_
in this, that they are _both substances_. So when I conceive my self as
_now_ in being, and also remember, that _heretofore_ I _have been_; and
since I have _divers_ thoughts, which I can _number_ or _count_; from
hence it is that I come by the notions of _duration_ and _number_; which
afterwards I apply to other things.
As to those other things, of which the _Idea_ of a _body_ is made up, as
_extension_, _figure_, _place_ and _motion_, they are not _formally_ in
me, seeing I am only a _thinking thing_; yet seeing they are only certain
_modes_ of _substance_, and I my self also am a _substance_, they may
seem to be in me _eminently_.
* Wherefore there only Remains the _Idea_ of a _God_, wherein I must
consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly
have its _original_ from me. By the word _God_, I mean a certain
_Infinite Substance_, _Independent_, _Omniscient_, _Almighty_, by whom
both _I my self_, and every thing else that _is_ (if any thing do
_Actualy exist_) was created. All which _Attributes_ are of such an _high
nature_, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive
my self possible to be the _Author_ of these notions.
From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a _God_;
for tho the _Idea_ of _substance_ may arise in me, because that I my
self am a _substance_, yet I could not have the _Idea_ of an _Infinite
substance_ (seeing I my self am _finite_) unless it proceeded from a
_substance_ which is _really Infinite_. Neither ought I to think that
I have no _true Idea_ of _Infinity_, or that I perceive it only by the
_negation_ of what is _finite_, as I conceive _rest_ and _darkness_ by
the _negation_ or _absence_ of _motion_ or _light_. But on the contrary
I plainly understand, that there is _more reality_ in an _Infinite
substance_, then in a _Finite_; and that therefore the _perception_
of an _Infinite_ (as _God_) is _antecedent_ to the _notion_ I have of
a _finite_ (as _my self_). For how should I know that I _doubt_ or
_desire_, that is to say, that I _want_ something, and that I am _not
altogether perfect_, unless I had the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_
then _my self_, by _comparing_ my self to which I may discover my own
_Imperfections_.
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