interests which it embraces. As far as the time allowed me will permit, I propose to discuss two questions. The first is, “_Whether Congress can lawfully legislate on the subject of slavery in the territories_.” On this question a new and most extraordinary doctrine has lately been broached. A new reading of the constitution has been discovered. It is averred that the 3d section of the 4th article, giving Congress power “to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States,” only gives power to legislate for the land _as land_. It is admitted that Congress may legislate for the land _as land_,--geologically or botanically considered,--perhaps for the beasts that roam upon its surface, or the fishes that swim in its waters; but it is denied that Congress possesses any power to determine the laws and the institutions of those who shall inhabit that “land.” But compare this with any other object of purchase or possession. When Texas was admitted into the Union, it transferred its “navy” to the United States; in other words, the United States bought, and of course owned, the navy of Texas. What power had Congress over this navy, after the purchase? According to the new doctrine, it could pass laws for the hull, the masts, and the sails of the Texan ships, but would have no power to navigate them by officers and men. It might govern the ships as so much wood, iron, and cordage, but would have no authority over commanders or crews. But we are challenged to show any clause in the constitution which confers an _express_ power to legislate over the territories we possess. I challenge our opponents to show any clause which confers express power to acquire those territories themselves. If, then, the power to acquire exists, it exists by implication and inference; and if the power _to acquire_ be an implied one, the power _to govern what is acquired_ must be implied also. For, for what purpose does any man acquire property but to govern and control it? What does a buyer pay for, if it be not the right to “dispose of”? Such is the doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States: “The right to govern,” says Chief Justice Marshall, “may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire.” _Amer. Ins. Co._ vs. _Canter_, _1 Peters_, 542. See also _McCullough_ vs. _Maryland_, _4 Wheat._, 422. _The Cherokee Nation_ vs. _Georgia_, _5 Peters_, 44. _United States_ vs. _Gratiot_, _14 Peters_, 537.