Now, consider that the general right of trial by jury, in cases of _life_, was expressly secured by the constitution as originally adopted; that, somewhat more than three years afterwards, the same right was expressly secured for _property_, in suits at common law, whenever the value in controversy should exceed twenty dollars; and then say whether there is not the strongest implication in favor of the same right, in cases of human liberty, which is so much more precious than life and property combined. I do not here say it is an implication that binds the courts in administering a law. That is not the point under discussion. But is it not an implication that binds the _legislator_, so that when legislating on the subject, he cannot consciously and wilfully abandon it without infidelity to his oath? I do not believe that many men from the free states will ever be found in Congress who will not take this view of the subject. Indeed, not a few of the best lawyers and jurists have held that the implication binds the courts; and therefore that the statute of 1793 is unconstitutional.[11] Mr. Webster treats the two cases, of fugitives from justice and fugitives from service, alike; although one can almost adopt his own language, and say that “nothing is more false” than that they are alike. In regard to the first class, the constitution says, a person “_charged_” with treason, &c.; but in regard to the second class, it says no person “_held_,” &c. According to the obvious intent of this language, the alleged fugitive must be _proved_ to be _held_, _bound_, _obligated_. It is not enough that he be _charged_ to be “held” to service, though it is enough that a man be “_charged_” with crime. To bring the first case within the legal category of the second, its terms should be, “a person _guilty_ of treason,” &c., shall be delivered up. Were such the phraseology, would any one doubt that proof of guilt should precede delivery, and that there could be no other foundation for it? Mr. Webster says, “perhaps the only insuperable difficulty” to a trial by a jury, “has been created by the states themselves.” Suppose this to be so, I would ask whose duty is it to act first,--that of Congress to provide the trial, or that of the states to remove the impediment? Shall the states repeal their laws first, and leave the liberty of the citizens in jeopardy; or shall not Congress legislate first, and secure that liberty? Which is of the greater importance, that the owner should recover his slave, or that the citizen should retain his freedom? I answer according to the language which the criminal law uses respecting guilt and innocence, that it is better that nine hundred and ninety-nine, that is, an indefinite number of slaves should escape, than that one free man should be delivered into bondage.