Fosgate[57] asserts that the power of judging during sleep is probably as good as when we are awake, for decisions are made only on the premises presented in either case, and if those in the former condition are absurd or unreasonable, the conclusion will likewise be faulty. But this is not very accurate reasoning; for it is as much the province of the judgment to determine the validity of the premises as it is to draw a conclusion from them, and if it cannot recognize the falsity or truth of propositions the irrational character of which would be readily perceived during wakefulness, there is not much to be said in favor of its power. In fact, however, the conclusions formed in dreams are often without any logical relation with the premises. Thus, when an individual dreams, as in the instance previously quoted, that he is a column of stone, it is contrary to all experience to deduce therefrom the conclusion that he can see rocks crumbling around him, and can reflect upon the mutability of all things. The premise of his being a stone pillar being submitted to the judgment, the proper conclusion would be that he is composed of inorganic material, is devoid of life, and consequently not possessed of either sensation or understanding. Why the judgment is not properly exercised during sleep we do not know. Dr. Philip[58] believes that in this condition ideas flow so rapidly that they are not submitted to the full power of the judgment, and that hence the absurdity which characterizes them is not perceived. But this explanation is by no means satisfactory; for a merely swift succession of ideas is no very serious bar to correct judgment, and when the thoughts are as preposterous as those which so often occur in dreams, they present no obstacle at all to a proper estimation of them by the healthy mind. The cause probably resides in some alteration in the circulation of the blood in that part of the brain which presides over the judgment, whereby its power is suspended and the imagination left free to fill the mind with its incongruous and fantastic images. As regards the will, we find very opposite opinions entertained relative to its activity; but no one, so far as I am aware, appears to have had correct views upon the subject. Without going into a full discussion of the views enunciated, it will be sufficient to refer to the ideas on the point in question which have been expressed by some of the most eminent philosophers and physiologists. In the course of his remarks on sleep, Darwin[59] repeatedly alleges that during this condition the action of the will is entirely suspended; but he falls into the singular error of confounding volition with the power of motion. Thus he says: