For instance; if several persons agree to commit a murder, or other felony, and each man takes his part: some are appointed to commit the fact, others to watch at a distance to prevent a surprise, or to favour the escape of those who are more immediately engaged; the law says, that if the felony be committed, it is the act of all of them; for each man operated in his station towards the commission of it, at one and the same instant. And so much doth the law abhor combinations of this kind, especially where innocent blood is shed, that a man may, in judgment of the law, be involved in the guilt of murder, when possibly his heart abhorred the thoughts of it. For if numbers of people assemble in prosecution of an unlawful design, with a resolution to stand by each other against all opposers, and a murder is committed by one of the party in prosecution of that design, every man so engaged at the time of the murder, is, in the eye of the law, equally guilty with him that gave the stroke. “Many cases might be put which come under this rule. I will confine myself to a few which the present solemnity naturally suggests. “For instance: Numbers of people assemble for the purpose of running uncustomed goods, or for any of the purposes which now go under the term of smuggling, with a resolution to resist all opposers (and the riding with firearms and other offensive weapons is certainly an evidence of that resolution); numbers of people, I say, assemble in this manner and for this purpose. They are met by the officers of the revenue; one of the party, _in the prosecution of this unlawful design_, fires on the King’s officer, and kills him or any of his assistants: the whole party is, in the eye of the law, guilty of murder, though their original intention went no further than smuggling; for that intention being unlawful, the killing in prosecution of that intent is murder, and every man engaged in it partakes of the guilt. The act of one, in prosecution of their common engagement, is considered as the act of all. “I will go one step further: the party assembled in the manner and for the purposes I have mentioned, is met by the King’s officers, and an affray happens between them; during the affray one of the party fires at the King’s officers, but misses his aim, and kills one of his own party, perhaps his nearest relation or bosom friend (if people of that character are capable of true friendship). This is murder in him and in the whole party too. For if a man upon malice against another strikes at him and by accident kills a third person, the law, as it were, transfers the circumstance of malice from him that was aimed at to him that received the blow and died by it. And consequently, in the case I have just put, the person who discharged the gun being guilty of murder, all his accomplices are involved in his guilt; because the gun was discharged in prosecution of their common engagement, and it is therefore considered as the act of the whole party.