Social organization : $b A study of the larger mindCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Social organization : $b A study of the larger mind
Cooley, Charles Horton
Social psychology; Sociology
The bearing of this view of human nature may perhaps be made clearer by
considering its relation to the familiar but now somewhat discredited
doctrine of Natural Right. This is traced from the speculations of
Greek philosophers down through Roman jurisprudence to Hobbes, Locke,
Rousseau, and others, who gave it its modern forms and through whose
works it became a factor in modern history. It was familiar to our
forefathers and is set forth in the Declaration of Independence.
According to it society is made up, primarily, of free individuals, who
must be held to create government and other institutions by a sort of
implied contract, yielding up a part of their natural right in order
to enjoy the benefits of organization. But if the organization does
not confer these benefits, then, as most writers held, it is wrong and
void, and the individuals may properly reclaim their natural freedom.
Now in form this doctrine is wholly at variance with evolutionary
thought. To the latter, society is an organic growth; there is no
individual apart from society, no freedom apart from organization,
no social contract of the sort taught by these philosophers. In its
practical applications, however, the teaching of natural right is not
so absurd and obsolete as is sometimes imagined. If it is true that
human nature is developed in primary groups which are everywhere much
the same, and that there also springs from these a common idealism
which institutions strive to express, we have a ground for somewhat
the same conclusions as come from the theory of a natural freedom
modified by contract. Natural freedom would correspond roughly to the
ideals generated and partly realized in primary association, the social
contract to the limitations these ideals encounter in seeking a larger
expression.
Indeed, is it not true that the natural rights of this philosophy—the
right to personal freedom, the right to labor, the right to property,
the right to open competition—are ideals which in reality sprang
then as they do now largely from what the philosophers knew of the
activities of men in small, face-to-face groups?
The reluctance to give up ideals like those of the Declaration of
Independence, without something equally simple and human to take their
place, is healthy and need not look far for theoretical justification.
The idea of the germinal character of primary association is one that
is fast making its way in education and philanthropy. As we learn that
man is altogether social and never seen truly except in connection with
his fellows, we fix our attention more and more on group conditions as
the source, for better or worse, of personal character, and come to
feel that we must work on the individual through the web of relations
in which he actually lives.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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