We need to watch this fighting-line and take care of the wounded—see to
it, that is, that those who fall into misery are given a chance to
recover, if they are capable of it, and at any rate are not allowed to
extend their condition to whole neighborhoods and form infectious misery
environments. Unless we can abolish the struggle altogether, which seems
neither possible nor desirable, I do not see how we can expect to avoid
sporadic misery as a by-product of it; but what we _can_ do is so to
standardize the conditions of the struggle and the care of those who
fail as to prevent the growth of a self-perpetuating misery class.
Scientific _a priori_ tests of fitness to propagate, such as may be
developed by the aid of family records or medical and psychological
examinations, will probably be found of increasing value in eliminating
the definitely degenerate by segregation or sterilization. It is not
probable, however, that they can ever meet the more general need of a
competitive standard of biological competence.
There are two fundamental and possibly permanent reasons why we cannot
select our hereditary types artificially: first, because we are not
likely to agree as to just what types are desirable, and, second,
because if we did agree there is no practicable method of ascertaining
the individuals belonging to these types and controlling their
propagation.
Selective breeding is a comparatively simple matter with domestic
animals, where what we seek is a definite and easily ascertained trait
like length or fineness of wool in sheep, weight in hogs or beef-cattle,
speed or strength in horses, laying capacity in fowls, and so on. But in
the case of man we do not know just what we want, and probably never
shall. We should not dare to set up a standard of physical vigor, for
fear of excluding psychical powers of more value; and the social and
moral traits which we might desire to increase do not manifest
themselves with certainty until rather late in life.
Moreover, it is clear that the desirable thing in human life is not one
good type but many, a diversity of types corresponding to multifarious
and unforeseeable functions. It is most unlikely that we shall ever
assume to define these types in advance.
These difficulties seem so insuperable that it is hardly necessary to go
on and show that, owing to the great share which environment has in
producing desirable types of character, it is difficult to see how we
could be sure what individuals lacked the requisite hereditary capacity.
Galton’s view that success is a fair test has little following, and no
other test is at hand. I conclude, then, that the sphere of a scientific
eugenics, which shall deliberately select some types for propagation and
reject others, should probably not extend much beyond the suppression of
clearly marked kinds of degeneracy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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