Social Rights And Duties: Addresses to Ethical Societies. Vol 2 [of 2]Stephen, Leslie
Philosophy
Social Rights And Duties: Addresses to Ethical Societies. Vol 2 [of 2]
Stephen, Leslie
Ethics, Evolutionary; Social ethics
How far such
conditions were sufficient I cannot even guess; but at least an
allowance must be made for them before we can argue from the
achievements to the intrinsic power of the race which achieved. I do not
see that it is even "proved" that the average Athenian was in the least
superior in this sense to the average Englishman. It would require a
lifetime of study to pronounce any opinion worth having. I fully confess
that, so far as a vague impression is worth anything, it is the most
obvious impression, after looking at the Elgin marbles, that the Greeks
were possessed of a finer organisation than ourselves. Still, I cannot
accept as certain the quasi-mathematical formula that the Greek is to
the Englishman as the Englishman to the negro.
This, however, suggests another and very difficult series of problems.
Mr. Kidd is arguing against intellectual superiority. He, of course,
does not argue that the general superiority of a race leads to its
disappearance; but that a one-sided superiority--an improvement of one
set of faculties at the expense of others--may have that result. This at
once suggests a whole series of psychological problems. The intellect
and the emotional nature are not two separate organs, each capable of
independent development. Every mental process involves both, and neither
faculty can be developed without reference to the other. Mr. Kidd
accepts the conclusion that certain primitive races were as clever as
ourselves, because their brains were as large. If the argument be sound,
it proves equally that their emotional nature was as well developed as
ours; for no one can doubt that the brain is the physical condition of
feeling as well as of thought. Even the most abstract thought, as he
elsewhere notices, implies certain moral qualities. Newton remarked that
he was superior to other men, not because his intellect was clearer,
but because he attended more persistently to his problems. The
statement, I think, involves a fallacy. Newton himself, no doubt, did
better the longer he kept a problem before him. He inferred,
unjustifiably, that of two different men, the one who could keep up his
attention longest would be the best. That does not follow. The
difference may indeed be moral as well as intellectual; and it is quite
true that a power of sustained attention is of the highest importance in
mathematics, and that that power supposes a moral quality; but,
conversely, the power of attention probably implies also the power of
clear intellectual vision. A muddle-headed man would find attention
useless. This is, of course, still clearer in the case where the mind is
exercised upon questions of human interest. The statesman and the
dramatist both depend upon their power of sympathy and the strength of
their emotions, as much as upon their logical capacity. To feel for
others I must imagine their position: if I imagine it, I can hardly
avoid feeling for them. "Altruism" is the product, in other words, of a
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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