Social Rights And Duties: Addresses to Ethical Societies. Vol 2 [of 2]Stephen, Leslie
Philosophy
Social Rights And Duties: Addresses to Ethical Societies. Vol 2 [of 2]
Stephen, Leslie
Ethics, Evolutionary; Social ethics
Trying, once more, to discover what it is that alarms, or is said to
alarm, some people, we are reminded of certain facts, which again are of
profound interest in some respects. I take a special instance,--not,
unfortunately, a rare or at all a strange instance,--to illustrate the
point. Many years ago I knew a clergyman, a man of most amiable
character and refined tastes. One morning he shocked his friends by
performing the Church service in a state of intoxication, and within a
few months had drunk himself to death. The case was explained,--that is,
a proper name for it was found,--when we learnt that more than one of
his nearest relations had developed similar propensities, and died in
much the same way. Then we called it an instance of "hereditary
dipsomania," and were more or less consoled by the classification. We
were not, I think, unreasonable. The discovery proved apparently that
the man whom we had respected and admired was not a vulgar debauchee,
who had been hypocritically concealing his vices; but that he had really
possessed the excellent qualities attributed to him, only combined with
an unfortunate constitutional tendency, which was as much a part of his
original nature as a tendency to gout or consumption. Now this, as I
think, suggests the problem which puzzles us at times. A man develops
some vicious propensity, for which we were quite unprepared. In some
cases, perhaps, he may show homicidal mania or kleptomania, or some of
the other manias which physicians have discovered in late years. They
say, though the lawyers are rather recalcitrant, that a man suffering
from such a mania is not "responsible"; and if asked, why not? they
reply, because he was the victim of a disease which made him unable to
resist the morbid impulse. But then, we say, are not all our actions
dependent upon our physical constitution? If a man develops homicidal
mania, may not a murderer of the average type excuse himself upon the
same ground? You have committed an action, we say, which shows you to be
a man of abnormal wickedness. You are a bloodthirsty, ferocious,
inhuman villain. Certainly, he may reply; but if you could examine my
brain you would see that I could not be anything else. There is
something wrong about its molecular construction, or about the shape of
the skull into which it was fitted, which makes bloodthirstiness quite
as inevitable in me as a tendency to drink is in others, or perhaps as
the most ardent philanthropy may be in some. In short, I am a murderer;
but wickedness is so natural to me that you must in all fairness excuse
me.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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