Some further distinctions are necessary. When we say "absolute magnitude," we do not mean a magnitude which stands out of all relations to other facts in the universe. There is no intention of setting up a metaphysical absolute here. The terms "positive" and "relative" (suggested by Professor Taylor)[31] might serve our purpose better, except for the fact that we wish to reserve the term "positive value" to contrast with "negative value" at a later stage of our discussion. Our objection to the relative conception of value really gives our value more, rather than less relations. Instead of allowing its relation to one particular thing, namely, some other good with which it happens to be compared, to determine its amount, we insist that that relation is so much a minor matter that it can generally be ignored, and that the significant relations--a very numerous set of relations indeed, as we shall later see!--are of another sort. The contention is that value is absolute only in this sense: its amount is not determined by the particular exchange ratio in which it happens to be put, and is not changed _eo ipso_ every time a new comparison is made. Further, it is in the process of exchange, and by the method of comparison, that the value of goods becomes quantitatively _known_, as a rule. That is to say, we find out precisely _how much_ value a good has by comparing it in exchange with some other good. In this respect, value is again like other qualities. We measure lengths, weights, cubic contents of objects, all by comparison, direct or indirect, with other objects. But the amount of water in a vessel is not changed when we put it into a measure, and determine how many gallons of it there are. Nor is the amount of value in a good _causally_ determined by the process of exchange.[32] We must distinguish between two confused meanings of the word "determine." It may mean "to cause," and it may mean "to find out" or "to measure." We must distinguish, in Kantian phrase, between the "_ratio essendi_" and the "_ratio cognoscendi_." _Value_ and _evaluation_ are two distinct things. Value, to anticipate a later part of the study, is primary, and grows out of the action of the volitional-emotional side of human-social life; evaluation is secondary, and is the intellectual process devoted, not to _giving_ value, but to _finding out_ how much value there is in a good. This distinction between the existence of a quantity, and our precise knowledge of its amount, is brought out by several writers, among them, General F. A. Walker,[33] and the keen mathematical economists, Pareto[34] and Edgeworth.[35]