The correctness of this statement appears from a letter addressed by General Brock, to Sir George Prevost, on the 13th September, 1812, from Fort George; in which he says, "that although he had learnt from deserters, (but which information he had reason afterwards to think, as he acknowledged, was not altogether correct), that great dissatisfaction prevailed amongst the American troops on the Niagara frontier, and that therefore much might be effected against such a body at that moment; that keeping in mind his excellency's instructions, and _aware of the policy of permitting such a force to dwindle away by it's own inefficient means, he did not_ CONTEMPLATE _any_ IMMEDIATE ATTACK." Two strong inferences naturally arise from this letter--the one, that General Brock must have considered the instructions received from Sir George Prevost, as to defensive measures not _positive_, as the Reviewer has thought fit to state them to have been, but _discretionary_; the other, that General Brock himself, was convinced of the policy of abstaining from offensive operations against an enemy circumstanced as the Americans then were. That this policy was a wise one, was manifest from the result. Had any attack been made on Fort Niagara, or had that general sweeping of the American garrisons on the frontier, (which the critic seems to think so easy an achievement) been attempted, there cannot be a doubt but that this invasion of the American territory, before the enemy had made an attack upon our own frontier, would have united the whole population, not only of the states bordering upon that line, but of every other part of the union, in the prosecution of the war. The militia already assembled upon that frontier, and who were known to be dissatisfied, and anxious to return to their homes, would in the event of an attack upon their territory, not only have cheerfully remained to repel the aggression, but would have been further obliged to pass the frontier, for the invasion of Canada; which, without such an attack on our part, they could not have been compelled to do. Aware of this circumstance, it was the policy of the American Government, to hold out lures to our officers, commanding on the frontiers, to induce them to commence an offensive warfare. Sir George Prevost, however, saw through their design, and fortunately disappointed it. The consequence was, that finding their militia could no longer be kept together, and that the season was fast approaching, when all offensive operations must cease, the American commanders urged the troops on that line, to that ill-concerted expedition, which ended in the battle of Queenstown, and which, though attended with the irreparable loss to the British forces of their gallant Commander, terminated in the disgrace and defeat of the American army; and was thus the means of preserving, at least for that campaign, the Province of Upper Canada. Brilliant as had been the success of our arms at the