That Sackett's Harbour could at that time, or at any other period of the winter, have been attacked with the smallest prospect of success, may be confidently denied. So far from the shipping, which by the Reviewer's[47] own showing, was a formidable squadron, commanded by an experienced officer, and manned by more than 500 able seamen, being, as he has asserted, indifferently protected, the enemy had constructed batteries for their defence, and it was known that a very considerable force had been assembled at that post, and in its neighbourhood, in order to be ready for embarkation as soon as the season would permit the fleet to take the Lake. To have attempted with the small force which then garrisoned Kingston, and which was scarcely sufficient for its defence, an expedition against an enemy's position, capable of a determined resistance, when it is considered that the troops would have been obliged to march several miles over the ice before they could reach the American territory, from whence they would still have been 15 miles distant from the object of their attack, and exposed during the whole of their approach to the concealed fire of the enemy's troops in the woods, would have been, under the circumstances in which Sir George Prevost was placed, with regard to his resources for defending Kingston, the Key, as it has been termed, to the Lower Province, little short of madness. Nothing but a determination to attach blame to the conduct of Sir George Prevost could have induced the Reviewer to hazard so groundless and unmilitary a stricture. That Sir George was alive to the importance of attacking this place, and of destroying the means there possessed by the enemy for increasing their marine, and for carrying on from thence their offensive operations, will appear evident from the measure which will be immediately adverted to, and which has drawn upon the Commander of the forces the acrimonious censure of the Reviewer.