the following morning, the 29th, within 24 hours after the fleet had appeared off the place. It is a fact equally well known to every person engaged in this enterprise, that Sir George Prevost did not take the personal command of it, in the sense in which the Reviewer[51] would have it understood. That he accompanied the expedition was never denied, or attempted to be concealed. His zealous and anxious feelings prompted him to that measure, to prevent any delay in the contemplated service, should a reference to him become necessary. It is freely admitted, that when present he could not divest himself of his authority, or responsibility as Commander of the forces. But independently of its being contrary to all military usage, for the Governor in Chief and Commander of the forces in British North America, to assume the immediate command[52] of so inconsiderable a force, no instance of his interference took place until the period of the last attack, which certainly produced the greatest damage that the enemy sustained. The order to retreat was neither precipitate,[53] nor one which the gallant officers "believed with difficulty."[54] They were all convinced, not excepting the naval commander, Sir James Yeo, that it was impossible longer to contend with any prospect of success, and with our diminished means, against the superior numbers and resources of the enemy. It may indeed be confidently asserted, in direct opposition to the Reviewer's statement, that although "the troops withdrew to their boats in disappointment," at their not having been able to accomplish their object, they felt no disgrace in retiring from a contest which they had so long and so bravely supported; nor did either officers or men experience any indignation or shame at a retreat which, after the most gallant, though unavailing exertions, they knew to be indispensable for their own preservation. It may here be observed, that the situation of our troops at the time of the retreat was most critical. At that very period, a reinforcement of 600 men, under Colonel Tuttle, reached Sackett's Harbour. With the overwhelming superiority which this accession to their force gave the enemy, it is obvious that with very moderate pretensions to either skill or enterprise, they might have opposed most formidable obstacles to our re-embarkation. A further perseverance in the attack on our part, or the least delay in the retreat, would probably have ended in the capture or destruction of the whole of our troops. Fortunately, the coolness and deliberation with which that measure was executed, served to deceive the enemy with regard to our numbers and losses; and the re-embarkation being effected without opposition, the troops returned the same day to Kingston with the field-piece, camp-equipage, and prisoners which they had taken.