anchored in a position to afford any chance of success. Immediately upon the receipt of this letter, Sir George Prevost gave orders for the troops to be held in readiness to assault the enemy's works at the same time that the naval action should commence. On the 10th, the fleet not making its appearance, Sir George Prevost addressed a letter to Captain Downie, acknowledging the receipt of his communication of the 9th, and acquainting him that, in consequence of it, the troops had been held in readiness since six o'clock in the morning, to storm the enemy's works at nearly the same moment as the naval action should commence in the bay; that he ascribed the disappointment he had experienced to the unfortunate change of wind, and should rejoice to learn from him that his expectations had been frustrated by no other cause. At day-break, on the 11th, Sir George Prevost proceeded to the quarters of Lieutenant-General de Rottenburg, (who was second in command,) in company with the Adjutant-General, and acquainted him that, as the wind was then fair, the fleet, unless prevented by accident, might soon be expected, and therefore directed him immediately to circulate the orders for the troops to hold themselves in readiness, as directed on the preceding day. This was immediately done by Captain Burke, Assistant-Adjutant-General, who personally delivered these orders to Major-Generals Brisbane, Robinson, and Power, viz. to cook, and hold themselves in readiness as on the preceding day. These orders were so delivered by Captain Burke _before the fleet had made its appearance, and before the scaling of their guns was heard_. It seems by the time on shore to have been about eight o'clock when the fleet was first discovered, and about nine when it rounded Cumberland head, and stood into the Bay. Orders having been given by the Commander of the forces that the batteries should open upon the enemy's works, the moment the naval action should commence, they were accordingly opened, and actually commenced the fire a full quarter of an hour before the Confiance had fired a shot at the enemy's vessels. The fire from our shore-battery was so well served, that the enemy's Lake battery, the only one which could possibly annoy our squadron, or afford protection to that of the enemy (but from which not a shot was fired in the direction of the Lake) was very soon silenced, and the men driven from it to seek shelter in the higher redoubt. Almost immediately upon the commencement of the naval action, orders were despatched for the troops to take their allotted positions for the assault of the enemy's works. In consequence of these orders, the two brigades under Major-Generals Robinson and Power, proceeded in the rear of their Bivouacs, to approach the ford of the Saranac, which it was intended they should cross and proceed through the wood, in order to conceal their movements from the enemy, whose position it was then contemplated to attack in