E-text prepared by Suzanne Shell, Keith Edkins, and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY JULIAN S. CORBETT London 1911 [Illustration: _Sir Julian Corbett (courtesy D.M. Schurman)_] CONTENTS INTRODUCTION THE THEORETICAL STUDY OF WAR--ITS USE AND LIMITATIONS PART I. THEORY OF WAR I. THE THEORY OF WAR II. NATURES OF WARS--OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE III. NATURES OF WARS--LIMITED AND UNLIMITED IV. LIMITED WAR AND MARITIME EMPIRES V. WARS OF INTERVENTION--LIMITED INTERFERENCE IN UNLIMITED WAR VI. CONDITIONS OF STRENGTH IN LIMITED WAR PART II. THEORY OF NAVAL WAR I. THEORY OF THE OBJECT--COMMAND OF THE SEA II. THEORY OF THE MEANS--THE CONSTITUTION OF FLEETS III. THEORY OF THE METHOD--CONCENTRATION AND DISPERSAL OF FORCE PART III. CONDUCT OF NAVAL WAR I. INTRODUCTORY-- 1. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA 2. TYPICAL FORMS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS II. METHODS OF SECURING COMMAND-- 1. ON OBTAINING A DECISION 2. BLOCKADE III. METHODS OF DISPUTING COMMAND-- 1. DEFENSIVE FLEET OPERATIONS--"A FLEET IN BEING" 2. MINOR COUNTER-ATTACKS IV. METHODS OF EXERCISING COMMAND-- 1. DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION 2. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF TRADE 3. ATTACK, DEFENCE, AND SUPPORT OF MILITARY EXPEDITIONS Appendix: The "Green Pamphlet" INDEX * * * * * INTRODUCTION The Theoretical Study of War--Its Use and Limitations * * * * * At first sight nothing can appear more unpractical, less promising of useful result, than to approach the study of war with a theory. There seems indeed to be something essentially antagonistic between the habit of mind that seeks theoretical guidance and that which makes for the successful conduct of war. The conduct of war is so much a question of personality, of character, of common-sense, of rapid decision upon complex and ever-shifting factors, and those factors themselves are so varied, so intangible, so dependent upon unstable moral and physical conditions, that it seems incapable of being reduced to anything like true scientific analysis. At the bare idea of a theory or "science" of war the mind recurs uneasily to well-known cases where highly "scientific" officers failed as leaders. Yet, on the other hand, no one will deny that since the great theorists of the early nineteenth century attempted to produce a reasoned theory of war, its planning and conduct have acquired a method, a precision, and a certainty of grasp which were unknown before. Still less will any one deny the value which the shrewdest and most successful leaders in war have placed upon the work of the classical strategical writers.