Almighty God is to be sure infinitely removed from all those human weaknesses which we express by the words, captious, apt to take offence, &c. But an unthinking world does not consider what may be absolutely due to Him from all Creatures capable of considering themselves as His Creatures. Recollect the idea, inadequate as it is, which we have of God, and the idea of ourselves, and carelessness with regard to Him, whether we are to worship Him at all, whether we worship Him in a right manner, or conceited confidence that we do so, will seem to imply unspeakable Presumption. Neither do we know what necessary, unalterable connexion there may be, between moral right and happiness, moral wrong and misery. Sincerity is doubtless the thing, and not whether we hit the right manner, &c. But a sense of the imperfection of our worship, apprehension that it may be, and a degree of fear that it is, in some respects erroneous, may perhaps be a temper of mind not unbecoming such poor creatures as we are, in our addresses to God. In proportion as we are assured that we are honest and sincere, we may rest satisfied that God cannot be offended with us, but indifference whether what we do be materially, or in the nature of the thing abstracted from our way of considering it, Good and Right,--such indifference is utterly inconsistent with Sincerity. No person who has just notions of God can be afraid of His displeasure any further than as he is afraid of his own Character, whether it be what it ought: but so far as a man has reason to fear his own character, so far there must be reason to fear God's displeasure, or disapprobation; not from any doubt of His Perfection and Goodness, but merely from the belief of it. Is it possible that people can be Scepticks in _Opinion_, and yet without any doubtfulness, or solicitude about their _Actions_ and _Behaviour_? II. What a wonderful incongruity it is for a man to see the doubtfulness in which things are involved, and yet be impatient out of action, or vehement in it! Say a man is a Sceptick, and add what was said of Brutus, _quicquid vult valde vult_, and you say, there is the greatest Contrariety between his Understanding and his Temper that can be expressed in words. * * * * * In general a man ought not to do other people's duty for them; for their duty was appointed them for their exercise; and besides, who will do it in case of his death? Nor has a man any right to raise in others such a dependance upon him as that they must be miserable in case of his death, tho' whilst he lives he answers that dependance. * * * * *