Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy: Five EssaysSantayana, George
Philosophy
Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy: Five Essays
Santayana, George
Locke, John, 1632-1704; Philosophy, Modern
We may well say with Bradley that the good is self-realisation; but what
is the self? Certainly not the feeling or consciousness of the moment, nor
the life of the world, nor pure spirit. The self that can systematically
distinguish good from evil is an animal soul. It grows from a seed; its
potentiality is definite and its fate precarious; and in man it requires
society to rear it and tradition to educate it. The good is accordingly
social, in so far as the soul demands society; but it is the nature of the
individual that determines the kind and degree of sociability that is good
for him, and draws the line between society that is a benefit and society
that is a nuisance. To subordinate the soul fundamentally to society or
the individual to the state is sheer barbarism: the Greeks, sometimes
invoked to support this form of idolatry, were never guilty of it; on the
contrary, their lawgivers were always reforming and planning the state so
that the soul might be perfect in it. Discipline is a help to the spirit:
but even social relations, when like love, friendship, or sport they are
spontaneous and good in themselves, retire as far as possible from the
pressure of the world, and build their paradise apart, simple, and hidden
in the wilderness; while all the ultimate hopes and assurances of the
spirit escape altogether into the silent society of nature, of truth, of
essence, far from those fatuous worldly conventions which hardly make up
for their tyranny by their instability: for the prevalent moral fashion is
always growing old, and human nature is always becoming young again.
World-worship is the expedient of those who, having lost the soul that is
in them, look for it in things external, where there is no soul: and by a
curious recoil, it is also the expedient of those who seek their lost soul
in actual consciousness, where it also is not: for sensations and ideas
are not the soul but only passing and partial products of its profound
animal life. Moral consciousness in particular would never have arisen and
would be gratuitous, save for the ferocious bias of a natural living
creature, defending itself against its thousand enemies.
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