Sound Mind: Or, Contributions to the natural history and physiology of the human intellect — John Shaqi
Sound Mind: Or, Contributions to the natural history and physiology of the human intellectHaslam, John
Science
Sound Mind: Or, Contributions to the natural history and physiology of the human intellect
Haslam, John
Intellect; Mental health
As a general observation, it may be remarked that the same influence of
the will, which directs the movements of the body, is likewise exerted
over the faculties of the mind; although generally in an inferior
degree, both from the greater difficulty and less importance of the
latter, for the ordinary purposes of life. When we observe the
newly-born infant,--that helpless mass of animation,--we perceive no
indications to induce us to conclude, that it possesses a voluntary
power of directing its movements.[13] It is furnished with the organs
of motion, but is unable to exert that influence which manifests
direction; yet its involuntary motions continue perfect, and these, as
will be subsequently explained, may be considered in their nature and
effects as very similar to that, which, in animals, is termed instinct.
In the progress of this enquiry, it will be seen that some degree of
mental advancement must have been made, before the infant can _direct_
any of the motions of its body; because direction implies knowledge to
an extent sufficient for the purposes of command, and also a
consciousness of the effort. In the infant, all the organs of sense by
degrees become awaked by their appropriate stimuli or objects, and
perception is the result. Although we have no memory of our earliest
perceptions, which are solely produced by the excitation of external
objects, without any direction of the will; yet from the mental
indications of the infant, these perceptions would seem to be confused
and indistinct. It is some time before the eye appears to notice, and
longer before the hand can grasp and manipulate the substances within
its reach: in this state, volition would be superfluous if it were
possessed. By slow gradations, we find the child capable of directing
its eye, of listening to sounds, and of examining by the touch; and
these imply the efforts of the will, which appear to be subsequent to
perception. As we advance in knowledge, our perceptions, which are the
sources of intelligence, are principally acquired by the agency of
volition, which directs the organ to the object, but we still continue
to be acted on involuntarily by forcible impressions, or striking
phenomena.
Previously to the acquirement of language, perception, memory, and
volition are in their simplest state, such as we observe in animals, and
as in them, we are only able to estimate the amount of their mental
possessions, from the intellectual phenomena they display. In the
infant, the separate and combined examination of objects by the eye and
touch are the circumstances most deserving of notice.
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