South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 1 (of 8): From the Foundation of Cape Colony to the Boer Ultimatum of 9th Oct. 1899Creswicke, Louis
History
South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 1 (of 8): From the Foundation of Cape Colony to the Boer Ultimatum of 9th Oct. 1899
Creswicke, Louis
South African War, 1899-1902; Transvaal (South Africa) -- History
magistrate, "Yes, you have beaten us--you have beaten us well; but
there," pointing eastward, "there are the Amazulu warriors. Can you
beat them? They say not. Go and try. Don't trouble any more about
us, but go and beat _them_ and we shall be quiet enough." This
anecdote serves to describe the general sentiment of disdain for
British authority which Sir Bartle Frere detected almost immediately
after his arrival among the natives, and to account in a measure for
what has been declared to be his high-handed policy. He was
convinced that we could never expect peace among the chiefs until we
had satisfied them who was master. A lesson was necessary to show
that the British Government could govern and meant to govern, and
that lesson he felt must be taught sooner or later. For a long time
Cetchwayo had been instigating rebellion and preparing for war. As
may be seen from Lord Carnarvon's letter of the 24th of January 1878
to Sir Bartle Frere, the Government was fully conscious of the
existing necessity to protect the Transvaal and to maintain British
prestige in South Africa. The despatch runs: "It seems certain that
the Zulu king has derived from his messengers the unfortunate idea
that the Kaffirs are able to cope with the Colony on more than equal
terms, and this belief has, as was inevitable, produced a very
threatening change in his language and conduct towards the Transvaal
Government. It is only too probable that a savage chief such as
Cetchwayo, supported by a powerful army already excited by the
recent successes of a neighbouring tribe over the late Government of
the Transvaal, may now become fired with the idea of victory over
her Majesty's forces, and that a deliberate attempt upon her
Majesty's territories may ensue. Should this unfortunately happen,
you must understand that at whatever sacrifice it is imperatively
necessary that her Majesty's forces in Natal and the Transvaal must
be reinforced by the immediate despatch of the military and naval
contingents now operating in the Cape, or such portion of them as
may be required. This is necessary not only for the safety of the
Transvaal, for the defence of which her Majesty's Government are
immediately concerned, but also in the interest of the Cape, since
a defeat of the Zulu king would act more powerfully than any other
means in disheartening the native races of South Africa."
On this subject Sir H. Bulwer wrote: "There has been for the last
eight or nine months a danger of collision with the Zulus at any
moment." And in November 1878 he said: "The system of government in
the Zulu country is so bad that any improvement seems hopeless. We
should, if necessary, be justified in deposing Cetchwayo."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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