South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 2 (of 8): From the Commencement of the War to the Battle of Colenso, 15th Dec. 1899Creswicke, Louis
History
South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 2 (of 8): From the Commencement of the War to the Battle of Colenso, 15th Dec. 1899
Creswicke, Louis
South African War, 1899-1902; Transvaal (South Africa) -- History
In spite of the energetic movements that were suddenly set on foot, a
few pessimists ventured to declare that we would be bound to reap the
results of our previous unpreparedness, and that in consequence of our
procrastination and the weakness of the Government in not having taken
the initiative and allowed us to mobilise earlier, the Boers would get a
good six weeks' start--a loss it would be hard for the best tacticians
or the finest fighting men in the world to retrieve. But the mouths of
the grumblers were silenced. Every one was convinced that the fate of
the nation was perfectly safe in the hands of Sir Redvers Buller and Mr.
Thomas Atkins, and, so convinced, thousands upon thousands flocked to
see them off, and roared their God-speed with cheery British lungs,
albeit with sad and anxious hearts.
THE OCCUPATION OF DUNDEE
Late in September a force consisting of two battalions of infantry, a
regiment of cavalry, and two field-batteries was hurriedly pushed
forward to occupy Dundee. Affairs between the British and the Boers were
nearing a crisis. It was beginning to be believed that the Dutchmen
meant to take the initiative and strike a blow against our supremacy in
South Africa, though some at home were still shilly-shallying with
sentimental arguments as to the propriety of fighting our "brother Boer"
at all. As we now know, it wanted but the smallest move on the part of
the British to bring things to a head. Large commandoes were gathered
together with a rapidity which would have been marvellous had the Boers
not designedly brought about the issue of war, and the frontier of the
northern angle of Natal was threatened. Dundee is an important
coal-mining centre situated some forty-eight miles north-east of
Ladysmith. Why it was chosen as our advance post is hard to decide. Its
communications with Ladysmith were open to attack from either flank,
and, in the light of after events, we see that the position there of a
detached force was highly precarious. General Sir George White in an
official despatch thus describes his action in the matter:--
"Since my arrival in the Colony I had been much impressed by the exposed
situation of the garrison of Glencoe, and on the evening of October 10 I
had an interview on the subject with his Excellency the Governor, at
which I laid before him my reasons for considering it expedient, from a
military point of view, to withdraw that garrison, and to concentrate
all my available troops at Ladysmith. After full discussion his
Excellency recorded his opinion that such a step would involve grave
political results and possibilities of so serious a nature that I
determined to accept the military risk of holding Dundee as the lesser
of two evils. I proceeded in person to Ladysmith on October 11, sending
on Lieutenant-General Sir William Penn Symons to take command at
Glencoe.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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