South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 3 (of 8): From the Battle of Colenso, 15th Dec. 1899, to Lord Roberts's Advance into the Free State, 12th Feb. 1900 — John Shaqi
South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 3 (of 8): From the Battle of Colenso, 15th Dec. 1899, to Lord Roberts's Advance into the Free State, 12th Feb. 1900Creswicke, Louis
History
South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 3 (of 8): From the Battle of Colenso, 15th Dec. 1899, to Lord Roberts's Advance into the Free State, 12th Feb. 1900
Creswicke, Louis
South African War, 1899-1902; Transvaal (South Africa) -- History
Noble as amazing was the hurried response of the Volunteers to the
intimation that their services would be accepted for the war. Hastily
they pressed forward in crowds to enrol themselves. Their promptitude
was goodly to look upon and to read of, for it showed that, in spite of
the theories of Tolstoi and the influence of the spirit of modernity,
patriotism is inherent and not a mere exotic or cultivated sentiment in
the British race. We now found that though many traditions may be worn
to rags, those of the British army had grown, like old tapestry, the
more precious for the passage of time.
Still the military position was pregnant with anxieties. A horse that is
left at the post may perhaps win in the end, but his chances of success
are remote. An army that lands in driblets three months after time is
scarcely calculated to succeed against a rival army which has spent that
interval in equipping itself for the fray. We were forced to remember
that at the onset our officers were placed in the most dangerous
positions, with inadequate support and no prospect of reinforcement,
until their energies, mental and physical, had been sapped by undue and
prolonged strain. On the north Tuli had but a handful of troops to
resist an enormous and powerful enemy; Mafeking was surrounded,
isolated, and able only to resist to the death the persistent attacks of
shot and shell; Vryburg was allowed to be treacherously given away to
the enemy; and Kimberley was left in the lurch as it were, to fight or
fall according to the pluck of those who were ready to exhaust their
vitality in loyalty to the Queen. On the Natal side things were still
worse. The country, every inch of which is familiar to the Boer, had
almost invited invasion. The whole strength of Boers and Free Staters
was permitted to launch itself against an army which was entirely
without reserves, and which could not be reinforced under a month. That
brave and unfortunate soldier, Sir George Colley, had a theory that
small, well-organised troops were worth as much again as large and
desultory ones; but he took no account of peculiar facilities which are
almost inherent to armies fighting on their own soil, as it were, and
habits of warfare which have, so to speak, become ancestral with the
Boer. From old time the Dutchman has employed his mountain fastnesses,
his boulders, and his tambookie grass as screens and shelters, till in
war the "tricks of the trade" have become a second nature to him, and
serve in place of more complicated European methods. The small Natal
army was, on Sir George Colley's principle, allowed to pit itself
against a fighting mass, dense and desultory it may be, but a fighting
mass of enormous dimensions, which, whatever their failings, had weight,
equipment, courage, obstinacy, and intimacy with their surroundings
entirely in their favour. That the enemy was first in the field they had
to thank the original promoters of war, the Peace party--the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account