South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 4 (of 8): From Lord Roberts' Entry into the Free State to the Battle of KarreeCreswicke, Louis
History
South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 4 (of 8): From Lord Roberts' Entry into the Free State to the Battle of Karree
Creswicke, Louis
South African War, 1899-1902; Transvaal (South Africa) -- History
the trustees of the nation for the work that has to be done.
The nation will support us, I believe; and so long as we
receive that support, God willing, we will fulfil our task."
Sir E. Clarke, among other things, said:--
"He did not believe the annexation of the Transvaal and the
Orange Free State would be of the slightest benefit to the
country. The annexation of the two Republics would compel us to
very greatly increase our already enormous military
expenditure, and it would not give us any advantage
commensurate with the difficulties of administration. He had no
desire to press his own views, which were singular, and
certainly not popular, on that side of the House. He only
pleaded that this question might be left open, and that
Ministers might not pledge themselves to a course which would
involve so great a sacrifice. While he agreed generally with
the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility, he considered that the
real responsibility for the war lay with the Colonial
Secretary. The Prime Minister, in whom all England put the
greatest confidence, having many other things to deal with, and
being distressed by domestic anxieties, might not have been
able to attend so closely as he otherwise would have done to
South African affairs; but it could not be gainsaid that there
were two men, one in this country and the other in South
Africa, who must be associated with the beginning of the war.
He wished that the highest sentiments of patriotism would
induce those two men to leave to others the positions they now
occupied. He believed that the difficulties involved in a
solution of the questions arising out of the war would be
increased by the fact that the lines of communication and
action in South Africa were in the hands of the Colonial
Secretary and Sir A. Milner. He had not a word to say about the
honesty of these two gentlemen; but if, for a few weeks or a
few months, in this grave national crisis and time of deep
anxiety, others could take their places--if the Prime Minister
himself would take under his own control the communications of
the Colonial Office with South Africa, and if Lord Rosebery
would give his services to the country, and go out to South
Africa to assist in a solution of the difficulties, it would be
a sacrifice not too great to ask even from the greatest men
among us, and one for which the country would be very grateful.
He had said that he was not going to make a controversial
speech. He did not think he had. If he had, it had been with no
intention of personal attack or party bitterness, but with the
deep conviction that in deciding on the great issues with which
Parliament had to deal we had to consider not only the things
of to-day but the things of the future."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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