In addition to these permanent publications, special war periodicals are issued, every one of them a German trumpet. Not least of these is the comic paper _La Guasa Internacional_, which holds up the Allies to ridicule and abhorrence in cartoons, squibs and sketches. A diary of the war with a review of political and military movements is given in the illustrated monthly _Crónica de la Guerra_. Another chronicle is _La Guerra Europea Mirada por un Sud-Americano_, a piece of war propaganda written by a Latin-American soldier, Señor Guerrero, who was, until recently, Peruvian military attaché at Berlin. But perhaps the most effective of these war periodicals is _La Gran Guerra en cuadros_, which presents, in a series of pictures, the war as meant to be seen by neutral eyes. All these periodicals attribute economic blunders and financial errors or weakness to the Allies, sometimes making adroit use of British or French self-criticisms: on the other hand, they magnify German economic strength and organisation. This main object appears in an article on "After-war commercial relations between Spanish America and Europe" published in _El Mensajero de Ultramar_, which argues that Germany will suffer least of all the belligerents from the effects of the war; and that afterwards she will be the best purchaser and also the most capable provider for Latin America. Such is the reiterated refrain of a host of periodical publications. In addition to periodicals, Germany pours over the Spanish-and Portuguese-speaking world a constant inundation of fly-leaves, photographs, pamphlets, books and miscellaneous war literature, preaching German strength, efficiency, humanity, and even the democratic character of German institutions. What is the result? Has German propaganda succeeded in moulding Latin-American opinion concerning the war? Opinion in those countries has been moved by an argument more potent than all the German propaganda, and that is the German submarine. The German offers to South America with one hand persuasive self-eulogies, while with the other hand he sinks her unarmed trading ships and drowns her sailors. Unrestricted submarine warfare and the barring of zones to navigation have drawn Brazil, by successive steps, into active belligerency, and have done much to bring about rupture of relations and declarations of war by other Latin-American republics. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that German propaganda has entirely failed. The Germans certainly think it worth while to continue it. The pavements of Buenos Aires are sometimes ankle-deep with pro-neutrality and anti-ally leaflets. But it is principally through the persistent and reiterated voice of the newspaper press, aided by the unremitting personal efforts of every German and every friend of Germany, that she wages this secondary warfare, this strategy of moral influence, which mobilises public opinion, diffuses impressions, colours events, creates an atmosphere.