[66] Ps., vol. i, p. 132. James well says 'Spencer broke new ground here in insisting that, since mind and its environment have evolved together, they must be studied together. He gave to the study of mind in isolation a definite quietus, and that certainly is a great thing to have achieved'. _Memories and Studies_, p. 140. [67] Ps., vol. i, p. 206. [68] Ps., vol. i, p. 124. [69] F. P., p. 120. Ps., vol. ii, p. 472. Cf. Ps., vol. i, p. 98. [70] The word underlying is used in the sense of occupying a lower position in the logical hierarchy above indicated. If any one likes to speak of the physico-chemical and the vital as two aspects of one process, he is free to do so. And if he likes to say that the vital is caused by the physico-chemical, let him do so; but he must define the exact sense in which he uses the ambiguous word cause. The word inner in the text means within the organism. [71] See S. Alexander, 'On Relations: and in particular the Cognitive Relation.' _Mind._, vol. xxi, N. S., No. 83, p. 318. [72] I have avoided the use of the word determine. It would be well to distinguish between that which is _determined_ from without, that is, conditioned, and that which is _determinate_, that is, grounded in the constitution. I am here, I think, in line with Bosanquet. (See _Principle of Individuality and Value_, e. g. pp. 341, 352.) I have also avoided all reference to teleology. Without committing myself to the acceptance of all that Mr. Bosanquet says in the fourth lecture of the series to which reference has just been made, his treatment, there, appears to be on right lines. There is no opposition in teleology, so treated, to what is determinate. Indeed, such teleology is the expression of the logical structure of the world, or, as Spencer would say, the universality of law. For just as higher types of relatedness imply a substratum of physico-chemical processes, so do all events imply the underlying logic of events. Cf. W. T. Marvin, _A First Book of Metaphysics_, ch. xiii, 'On the logical strata of reality.' [73] Cf. Ps., vol. i, pp. 99 and 140. [74] _Problems of Philosophy_, ch. v; cf. _Proc. Aristotelian Soc._, 1910-11, p. 108. [75] It should be distinctly understood that I here speak of one order of being in reference to the phenomena dealt with by science, including the cognitive phenomena discussed in the text. Whether we should speak of the Source of phenomena as constituting a separate order of being is a question I cannot discuss in a note. Does the logic of events imply a Logos? That is the question in brief. But, since the implication in question is not of the scientific kind, I may leave it on one side in considering a philosophy of science. [76] Ps., vol. i, p. 140. [77] F. P., p. 178.