It would take us too far from the line of Spencer's thought to consider M. Bergson's doctrine that it is the intellect that portions the world into lots;[26] that cuts the facts out of the interpenetrating whole of reality, and renders them artificially distinct within the continuity of becoming. It suffices to note that on such a presupposition 'the cardinal error of Spencer is to take experience already allotted as given, whereas the true problem is to know how the allotment was worked'.[27] I am not prepared to give--indeed I have been unable to find--M. Bergson's own solution of the problem. I gather that it was Life itself that somehow allotted concepts and objects in such correspondence as should be practically useful though metaphysically false and illusory. But just how it was done I have still to learn. 'The original activity was', we are told, 'a simple thing which became diversified through the very construction of mechanisms such as those of the brain,'[28] which, as Life's tool, has facilitated the chopping up of a continuous interpenetrating reality into mince-meat for intellectual assimilation. Such a conception was foreign to Spencer's thought. But some of us may find it hard to distinguish M. Bergson's 'original activity' from Spencer's Unknowable, which, so far as one can make out, somehow produced precisely the same results. As a matter of fact, M. Bergson seems to put into Life, as Spencer put into the Unknowable, the potentiality of producing all that actually exists. For Spencer, as for M. Bergson, we live in a world of change. But neither is content to accept changes as facts to be linked up within a scheme of scientific interpretation. Both must seek their Source. Now to inquire into the Source or Sources of phenomena is characteristic of man as thinker. And if, in common with those whom I follow, I regard this quest as beyond the limits of science, I am well aware that such delimitation of fields of inquiry is by no means universally accepted. M. Bergson, for example, regards metaphysics as the _Science_[29] which claims to dispense with symbols, which turns its back on analysis, which eschews logic, which dispenses with relativity and pierces to the absolute, which, apparently, uses the intellect only to establish its utter incompetence in this department of 'science'. Merely saying that this, whatever else it may be, is not what I, for one, understand by science--and not, by the way, what M. Bergson in other passages seems to mean by science[30]--I pass on to Spencer's treatment of the philosophy of science which, for him, is 'completely unified knowledge', 'the truths of philosophy bearing the same relation to the highest scientific truths that each of these bears to lower scientific truths.'