Presidents -- United States -- Messages; United States -- Politics and government -- Sources
In the one case the State would receive its quota of the national
revenue for domestic use upon a fixed principle as a matter of right,
and from a fund to the creation of which it had itself contributed its
fair proportion. Surely there could be nothing derogatory in that. As
matters now stand the States themselves, in their sovereign character,
are not unfrequently petitioners at the bar of the Federal Legislature
for such allowances out of the National Treasury as it may comport with
their pleasure or sense of duty to bestow upon them. It can not require
argument to prove which of the two courses is most compatible with the
efficiency or respectability of the State governments.
But all these are matters for discussion and dispassionate
consideration. That the desired adjustment would be attended with
difficulty affords no reason why it should not be attempted. The
effective operation of such motives would have prevented the adoption
of the Constitution under which we have so long lived and under the
benign influence of which our beloved country has so signally
prospered. The framers of that sacred instrument had greater
difficulties to overcome, and they did overcome them. The patriotism of
the people, directed by a deep conviction of the importance of the
Union, produced mutual concession and reciprocal forbearance. Strict
right was merged in a spirit of compromise, and the result has
consecrated their disinterested devotion to the general weal. Unless
the American people have degenerated, the same result can be again
effected when ever experience points out the necessity of a resort to
the same means to uphold the fabric which their fathers have reared.
It is beyond the power of man to make a system of government like ours
or any other operate with precise equality upon States situated like
those which compose this Confederacy; nor is inequality always
injustice. Every State can not expect to shape the measures of the
General Government to suit its own particular interests. The causes
which prevent it are seated in the nature of things, and can not be
entirely counteracted by human means. Mutual forbearance becomes,
therefore, a duty obligatory upon all, and we may, I am confident,
count upon a cheerful compliance with this high injunction on the part
of our constituents. It is not to be supposed that they will object to
make such comparatively inconsiderable sacrifices for the preservation
of rights and privileges which other less favored portions of the world
have in vain waded through seas of blood to acquire.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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