Mr. Sedgwick said the reason he could not consent was that Mr. Ashmead had intimated that he would make no strenuous opposition to a judgment for the people in this Court, in order that the case might go to the Court of Appeals at the next term; Mr. McKeon had left town with that understanding, but a few days since Mr. Ashmead gave notice that he would like to argue the questions here; counsel for the people were not therefore prepared. Mr. Ashmead would consent to judgment for the people _pro forma_, but Mr. Branch’s friends were importuning him to have the matter disposed of, as they feared he will not survive until the Court of Appeals meets in September. The Court suggested that if Mr. Branch’s health was such that his life was endangered, he could be admitted to bail. Mr. Sedgwick said that he could be bailed by an order of the Court. Judge Davies said this Court would adjourn to to-morrow or Saturday, for the purpose of hearing the argument, but Mr. Sedgwick could not say when Mr. McKeon would return. Upon the suggestion of the Court, the case took the regular order, to come before the General Term on the third Monday of September, which would give them time to go before the Court of Appeals on the fourth Tuesday of that month. Mr. Ashmead said that he had searched the books, and from the time of Charles the Second down to the present day, there is no such sentence to be found on record. The Court adjourned _sine die_. The following is the substance of Mr. Ashmead’s points for Branch: 1. In refusing to receive the testimony of the three witnesses who offered to prove that they told Branch the matters which he published, and which were charged as libellous, in order to rebut the implication of malice. 2. In charging the jury that if the defendant justified or proved the truth as to two of the parties charged, yet, that inasmuch as the indictment embraced a libel on three, he must still be found guilty. 3. That the whole proceedings are _coram non judice_, the Court having no jurisdiction to originate bills in case of misdemeanor. 4. In charging the jury that the law presumed malice from the publication of a libel, without instructing them at the same time that it was only a _prima facie_ presumption, and could be rebutted by evidence. * * * * *