Continuing to correct these errors, or to clear up misunderstandings, we shall also remark that the _symbol_ has sometimes been given as the essence of art. Now, if the symbol be conceived as inseparable from the artistic intuition, it is a synonym for the intuition itself, which always has an ideal character. There is no double bottom to art, but one only; in art all is symbolical, because all is ideal. But if the symbol be conceived as separable--if the symbol can be on one side, and on the other the thing symbolized, we fall back again into the intellectualist error: the so-called symbol is the exposition of an abstract concept, an _allegory_; it is science, or art aping science. But we must also be just toward the allegorical. Sometimes it is altogether harmless. Given the _Gerusalemme liberata,_ the allegory was imagined afterwards; given the _A done_ of Marino, the poet of the lascivious afterwards insinuated that it was written to show how "immoderate indulgence ends in pain"; given a statue of a beautiful woman, the sculptor can attach a label to the statue saying that it represents _Clemency_ or _Goodness._ This allegory that arrives attached to a finished work _post festum_ does not change the work of art. What then is it? It is an expression externally _added_ to another expression. A little page of prose is added to the _Gerusalemme,_ expressing another thought of the poet; a verse or a strophe is added to the _Adone,_ expressing what the poet would like to make a part of his public believe; to the statue nothing but the single word: _Clemency_ or _Goodness._ [Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of artistic and literary kinds._] But the greatest triumph of the intellectualist error lies in the theory of artistic and literary kinds, which still has vogue in literary treatises and disturbs the critics and the historians of art. Let us observe its genesis. The human mind can pass from the æsthetic to the logical, just because the former is a first step in respect to the latter. It can destroy expression, that is, the thought of the individual, by thinking of the universal. It can gather up expressive facts into logical relations. We have already shown that this operation becomes in its turn concrete in an expression, but this does not mean that the first expressions have not been destroyed. They have yielded their place to the new æsthetico-logical expressions. When we are on the second step, we have left the first.