And once the relation above expounded is established, all necessity for inquiry as to the nature of æsthetic, moral, intellectual and even what was sometimes called economic feelings, must disappear. In this last case, it is clear that it is a question, not of two terms, but of one, and inquiry as to economic feeling must be the same as that relating to economic activity. But in the other cases also, we must attend, not to the substantive, but to the adjective: the æsthetic, moral and logical character will explain the colouring of the feelings as æsthetic, moral and intellectual, whereas feeling, studied alone, will never explain those refractions and colorations. [Sidenote: _Meaning of certain ordinary distinctions of feelings._] A further consequence is, that we no longer need retain the well-known distinctions between values or feelings _of value,_ and feelings that are merely hedonistic and _without value_; _disinterested_ and _interested_ feelings, _objective_ feelings and feelings not _objective_ but simply _subjective_ feelings of _approbation_ and of _mere pleasure_ (cf. the distinction of _Gefallen_ and _Vergnügen_ in German). Those distinctions were used to save the three spiritual forms, which were recognized as the triad of the _True,_ the _Good_ and the _Beautiful,_ from confusion with the fourth form, still unknown, and therefore insidious in its indeterminateness and mother of scandals. For us this triad has completed its task, because we are capable of reaching the distinction far more directly, by receiving also the selfish, subjective, merely pleasurable feelings among the respectable forms of the spirit; and where formerly antitheses were conceived (by ourselves and others), between value and feelings, as between spirituality and naturality, henceforth we see nothing but differences between value and value. [Sidenote: _Value and disvalue: the contraries and their union._] As has already been said, feeling or the economic activity presents itself as divided into two poles, positive and negative, pleasure and pain, which we can now translate into useful and disuseful (or hurtful). This bipartition has already been noted above, as a mark of the activistic character of feeling, and one which is to be found in all forms of activity. If each of these is _value,_ each has opposed to it _antivalue_ or _disvalue._ Absence of value is not sufficient to cause dis value, but activity and passivity must be struggling between themselves, without the one getting the better of the other; hence the contradiction and disvalue of the activity that is embarrassed, impeded, or interrupted. Value is activity that unfolds itself freely: disvalue is its contrary.