The first reason is that the General Government, if it be regarded as an agency, is an agency for a joint concern, comprehending four and twenty principals. Now if we admit that principals have an unlimited right to construe the powers and disavow the acts of their agents, it is quite obvious that, in the case of a joint concern, this right cannot belong to any one of the partners acting separately from the others, but must belong to the whole firm, expressing their intentions for this purpose through the organs and in the form which they habitually employ for all other purposes. But the proposition of the Vice-President is, that any one State has a right, without consulting the other States, to nullify at discretion any act of the General Government. That is, that any one partner in the joint concern has a right, without even consulting his co-partners, to construe the powers of the common agent in his own way, and to assume or avoid, at discretion, his share of responsibility for the acts which an agent may have performed in the name of the firm. It is almost needless to say that this is not the principle on which partnership concerns are generally managed, and that a partnership concern, which should be managed on this principle, would not be likely to possess unlimited credit or to carry on for any length of time a very lucrative business. The Vice-President anticipates this objection, and for the purpose of meeting it has introduced the second and third points in his theory, as stated at the commencement of this article. As the manner in which he treats this part of the subject is quite curious, we shall quote his own words.