Such is the notion entertained by the Vice-President of the proper and usual mode of proceeding in a partnership concern. Our readers, who are at all familiar with business, will, we think, agree with us in the opinion that he has mistaken the matter entirely. In the case supposed, a Director of the Bank, who had heard of any facts which led him to suppose that Mr. Sergeant was exceeding his powers, instead of publishing the intelligence in the newspapers, and making it an occasion for open scandal, would have gone quietly to the Bank, and mentioned what he had heard in private to the President. The President would have submitted the facts to the Directors at their next meeting. If the Board, represented by the necessary number of members, were satisfied that Mr. Sergeant was in fact exceeding his powers, the President would have written to him to that effect, and the Board would have taken the proper measures for remedying any mischief that might have resulted from his mistake. In the other event, the discontented Director would have been relieved from his apprehensions. In either case, the affair would have passed off quietly, without scandal, and, according to our apprehension, in the ordinary and regular way of transacting business. Reasoning therefore analogically, from the relation between an agent and his principal in a partnership concern,--the only semblance of an argument which the Vice-President offers in support of his main position,--we should draw a conclusion of a directly opposite character, viz. that instead of proceeding at once to _nullify_ and throwing upon the General Government the responsibility of bringing the subject before the other States, it would be the duty of a discontented State to begin by addressing herself in the way of consultation to the other States, her co-partners in the great political firm of the Union. We have already shown that it would be wholly impracticable from the nature of the case for the General Government, believing itself, as it does by the supposition, to possess the disputed power, to adopt any measure implying a contrary opinion. We have shown that the General Government has no authority under the Constitution to adopt such a measure. But admitting that it were both constitutional and practicable, what propriety would there be in it? If Carolina conceive that she has a right to complain of the proceedings of the common agent of the political partnership to which she belongs, and think that her partners ought also to attend to the subject, is she not perfectly capable of saying to them herself all that is necessary or proper on the occasion? Is it not obvious that the agent, who is supposed to be in fault, is the very last person who can be depended on to bring the question before the tribunal which is to decide upon it? Is it reasonable to expect that he will intermeddle in a matter in which he has really no concern, for the